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11. Introduction
The growing concern about the state of biological diversity on our planet has raised global calls
for increased nature protection, especially in tropical biodiversity hot-spots such as
Madagascar. The aim of protecting habitats and species has often taken the form of strict
Protected Areas (hereafter PAs), designed and set up to minimise human influence in the area
(Brockington 2002). Despite the scientific rationalisation of conservation, experience from
decades of protected area management reveal inherent problems and challenges related to the
social dimensions of conservation (Adams & Hutton 2007). In the Global South, PAs are often
established in areas inhabited by small-scale rural communities whose livelihood depends
largely on the direct subsistence use of natural resources, to suddenly find themselves
confronted with a powerful, and externally imposed conservation agenda (ibid.). Indeed, local
communities have often been the ones paying the highest price for global conservation benefits
(Agrawal & Redford 2009). In this context, and already since the 1980s, there has been a
gradual move towards more inclusive conservation strategies that have taken many different
forms and approaches (Kothari et al. 2013; Berkes 2004).
The overarching aim of this study is to understand the relationship between conservation and
local communities through a case study of a few specific communities around Ranomafana
National Park in South-Eastern Madagascar. Key questions are: how does the global
conservation discourse influence local realities, and how could externally initiated conservation
agendas work with, not against, local community interests? Using an ethnographic approach,
the study places local individuals and communities at the focal point of the research, with an
attempt to i) understand their agency, incentives, and involvement in national park
management, ii) examine how they are influenced by global and national conservation
processes, and iii) question how they might be adapting to, or contesting the imposed rules and
regulations associated with the national park. This study also analyses, based on local
experiences, how the institutional arrangements governing PA management encourage or dis-
encourage local participation in conservation efforts, and what kinds of social implications the
current form of governance has. Understanding natural resource management requires
analysing the relationship among institutions at different scales of governance and across formal
and informal spheres (Leach et al. 1999), which is why this study looks at conservation actors
at multiple levels and spheres, the authorities they possess, and the rules and norms that guide
their action.
2The study draws largely from the theory of political ecology which, defining conservation as
primarily human activity, attempts to find answers to conservation problems from the ways in
which humans are organised and power shared (e.g. Brechin et al. 2002; Gezon 2007; Berkes
2004). Questions of environmental justice, legitimacy and representation in governance, and
empowerment of local communities (e.g. Adams & Hutton 2007; Schlosberg 2013) are
addressed in order to understand the reasons for local perceptions of conservation and give hints
on what the possibilities for local social organisation for managing natural resources might be,
further developed by common property theory (e.g. Ostrom 1990; Agrawal & Gibson 1999).
Below, I first present the broader discourse on PAs, their ideological roots and social impacts,
as well as the shifts towards newer conservation models that attempt to integrate local
communities in PA management (in Chapter 2). Chapter 3 lays out the theoretical framework
of the study and presents the research questions emerging from the theory. Chapter 4 introduces
the context of the case study: it describes the history and institutional arrangements of
conservation in Madagascar in general and in Ranomafana National Park specifically, and
finally considers how the current management plan addresses or involves local communities.
Chapter 5 presents the methods of data collection and analysis and describes the study area.
Results of the analysis are presented in Chapter 6 followed by a general discussion of the results
and methodological questions in Chapter 7, and a brief conclusion in Chapter 8.
2. Conservation in the Global South
This chapter gives a brief presentation of the history and main concepts related to biodiversity
conservation and Protected Areas. The aim is to understand how the originally western
conservation discourse shapes the realities in the Global South, and how it affects especially
rural, local communities in biodiversity hotspots. Forced displacements and disregarding local
communities’ rights have led to harsh effects on local communities but also to resistance and
conflicts with conservation authorities. The answers to these problems have been sought in
conservation models aiming at integrating local communities in conservation by addressing
their economic needs and, more recently, by giving them rights to manage their natural
resources.
2.1 Ideology and colonialism in nature conservation
The Global Biodiversity Strategy (WRI, IUCN, UNEP, 1992) defines conservation as a human
activity aiming at managing the human use of the biosphere so that it can sustainably fulfil the
needs of current and future human populations. As such, conservation can take different
3approaches, from restoration and sustainable use of natural resources to preservation, meaning
strict non-use.
The understandings of the relationship of indigenous or local communities with the ecosystems
they inhabit are extremely important of the practise and policy of conservation (Agrawal &
Gibson 1999; Robbins 2012). The idea that local communities are the main threat to
biodiversity are manifested e.g. in the form of fenced national parks and conservation policies
aiming to exclude local people from natural habitats around the world (e.g. Brockington 2002).
Such conservation policies were first initiated by colonial powers and later imposed on post-
colonial states and embedded in the strategies and mandates of international conservation
agencies (Brockington 2002; Pyhälä 2003). Even though originally imposed from outside, the
“fortress conservation” model continues to be strongly supported by many African governments
(Brockington 2002).
The national park as a model of conservation first emerged in the USA in the late nineteenth
century (Adams & Hutton 2007; Peters 1999). The idea of ‘wilderness’ which needs to be
preserved from any human intervention was created on the one hand out of the idea of nature
having intrinsic value and on the other hand out of a more anthropocentric will to preserve
nature for the growing urban population’s recreational needs. These ideas reflect the deep seated
Western conceptual division between nature and humans that continues to influence much of
the global conservation paradigm still today. The “governance” of nature that is pursued
through the development of science (assuming that nature can be understood, manipulated and
controlled) was evident already in European imperialism from the sixteenth century onwards
(Adams & Hutton 2007). At that time, Africa was presented as ‘wilderness’ in the European
imagination determining what Africa should look like and driving the establishment of national
parks (Neumann 1998).
Narratives of untouched nature and isolated communities, depicted by categories of landscapes
as “natural” or “pristine” versus “human-influenced” are challenged by historical ecologists
who show how people have been influencing biodiversity and forest structure around them for
millennia (e.g. Balée 1994). Many comparative studies show the coincidence of high
biodiversity and cultural and linguistic diversities (Maffi 2005). The stereotype of the
“ecologically noble savage” – primitive cultures, harmoniously managing their natural
resources in isolation from the rest of the world – first emerged among Europeans in the 17 th
century to describe native Americans and critique the modern, European society (Hames 2007).
Later, this stereotype has been argued to be a romanticised illusion while in reality, local
communities – and their relation to their surrounding environment – are much more complex
4and diverse. Redford (1991, cited in Hames 2007: 180) and others have argued that over-
exploitation or natural resources by native groups was prevented more likely by low population
density, low level of technological development, and lack of external market than by any
deliberate conservation efforts. Scholars of common property (e.g. Ostrom 1990, Agrawal
2007) on the other hand, have argued that communities can organise and manage their natural
resources sustainably (further discussed in Chapter 3.5).
The number of PAs in southern colonies grew rapidly after the Second World War in Africa
and in the 1970s in Latin America. By 2005, the number of PAs worldwide had amounted to
more than 100,000, covering over 2 million km² and existing in every country of the world
(Adams & Hutton 2007). The International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN 2014) has
defined seven categories of protected areas of which the Strict Nature Reserve is the most
exclusionary category aiming at strictly controlling human visitation, use and impacts and to a
large extent to exclude all other human activity from the area.
2.2 Social impacts of Protected Areas
Strict protected areas can cause a variety of problems to local, neighbouring communities.
Impacts and risks to local people include direct and indirect economic, social, and cultural
losses: landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, economic marginalisation, food insecurity,
increased health problems, increased mortality, loss of access to common property and services
and social marginalisation (Adams & Hutton 2007).
The most discussed negative phenomenon related to PAs is population displacement (Agrawal
& Redford 2009). Displacement has many meanings and Agrawal & Redford (2009) define it
as “involuntary physical removal of peoples from their historical or existing home areas as a
result of actions by governments or other organizational actors” (Agrawal & Redford 2009:
2). They also acknowledge ‘exclusion’ or ‘loss of access’ to vital assets and current or future
livelihood opportunities as a related phenomenon that can occur without any physical
resettlement. Also new, environmental risks may arise due to displacements and exclusion as
traditional production systems are dismantled or people are moved to environments where their
means of production are less applicable or competition for remaining resources increases
(World Bank 2004). Consequently, the creation of PAs has potentially enormous implications
not only on local livelihood and economy but also on local culture, identity, and social structure
as community institutions and social networks are weakened (Adams & Hutton 2007).
In  a  post-colonial  context,  corruption  is  a  common  problem  that  affects  the  ways  in  which
conservation policies are put into practice (Adams & Hutton 2007). Despite the last few decades
5of calls for more participatory approaches in conservation and development projects, local
people have in fact rarely been consulted or in any way involved in planning or designing PAs,
let alone in managing them or their fair share of the related revenues or benefits (Brown 2002;
Adams & Hutton 2007). Also, local people often face unjust or even abusive treatment by the
park staff (such as severe punishments or bribes to avoid arrest) for minor violations of park
boundaries or rules (such as cutting fuelwood or collecting medicinal plants) (Adams & Hutton
2007).
Protected areas can also generate benefits. The direct benefits are nowadays often referred to
as “ecosystem services” that all life depends on, i.e. clean air, clean water, species richness, etc.
(Adams & Hutton 2007). There are also more tangible, economic benefits: the biodiversity and
landscapes of protected areas serve as an attraction to international tourism, with potential to
bring income to local communities directly from entrance fees or employment, or indirectly
from related economic activities (ibid.). Also, development funds and social investments are
increasingly allocated to the zones around protected areas (ibid.).
Small-scale illegal extraction of resources often takes place in PAs: illegal hunting, gathering
or making charcoal can all bring income for those who carry out such activities (Adams &
Hutton 2007), although in such small amounts that it is often the poorest in a society who are
left to risk such illegal activities for poor rewards (e.g. Twinamatsiko et al. 2014). Attempts to
disincentivize such illegal activities often involve alternative development projects such as
revenue sharing and “community outreach” programs including education, income-generating
projects, health clinics, and more (Naughton-Treves et al. 2005; Gezon 2006). However, such
outreach activities have been found to bring very meagre, if any, direct benefits (Naughton-
Treves et al. 2005). The distribution of income from these different sources is another important
issue. If income is distributed within the existing social settings and power relations, it can
easily exacerbate the inequalities that already exist in the community and/or wider society: i.e.
the power to gain and distribute benefits remains in the hands of the employees of the national
park and local elites (Brown 2002; Adams & Hutton 2007).
Adams and Hutton (2007) point out a somewhat ironical feature of conservation: while all local
land uses may be forbidden in protected areas, tourism and science are regarded as tolerable
activities. Science has an integral role in conservation and its place in protected areas is not
much questioned (ibid.). Tourism, then again, has many negative impacts that have long been
recognised, but its place in PAs continues to be promoted partly because of the important
economic contribution of the tourist industry to national parks, and partly because the “urban
population’s recreation values” continue to be one of the drivers of national park ideology
6(ibid.). These recreational values, however, mostly serve international tourists and national
elites while local people are denied access, both to natural resources and to park revenues. In
sum, and as observed in many protected areas worldwide, local rural populations continue to
pay the price for global conservation benefits (Agrawal & Redford 2009).
The question thus remains: who decides the extent of burden, cost, or negative impact that local
populations can bear or tolerate in order for others (e.g. foreign tourists or the global
community) to be able to benefit, through e.g. supposed carbon storages in forest vegetation
and biodiversity protection? This question that is further discussed in the theory of
environmental justice (in Chapter 3.2) may have been asked too seldom in conservation
planning, but not without consequences: displacements due to conservation have not taken
place without opposition. The exclusionary conservation approach has in many cases caused
conflicts with local populations (Brockington 2004). Brockington argues that rural communities
are often politically weak and ill-equipped to contest protected areas that usually are mandated
by national governments, supported by international NGOs, and who are able to use coercive
power and threaten people with fines, imprisonment, or violence. Nevertheless, Agrawal and
Gibson (1999) state that decades of top-down conservation practices prove that coercive
conservation generally fails: the capacity of a state is limited to force its citizens to comply with
resource use rules that are conflicting their interests, especially when there are no livelihood
alternatives and when PAs are so inaccessible, large, distant, and therefore extremely difficult
and/or costly to patrol. There are cases where local opposition has reversed the outcomes of
conservation policy and forced conservation planners to recognise local communities’ rights
(see e.g. Peters 1999, Roth 2004, Cox & Elmqvist 1997). In sum, the exclusionary strict
protected area model has been criticised for being unethical towards local community rights
(Brockington et al. 2006), costly (Watson et al. 2014), and ineffective in achieving conservation
objectives as deforestation accelerates outside park boundaries isolating habitats (Naughton-
Treves et al. 2005; Mora & Sale 2011).
2.3 Towards more inclusive conservation
The concerns of harsh social impacts of exclusive PAs on local communities have increased
and raised discussion of the rights of local communities and the need to develop conservation
models that integrate local needs. Conservation discourse has shifted from favouring strict,
exclusionary PAs towards more ethically justifiable and socially and economically inclusive
conservation policies (Adams & Hutton 2007). Importantly, indigenous peoples and local
communities have increasingly begun to claim a stewardship over their ancestral lands
7(Agrawal & Gibson 1999). The Durban Action Plan drawn in the 5th IUCN World Parks
Congress in 2003, envisions existing and future PAs that are established and managed without
compromising the rights of indigenous peoples and local communities (IUCN 2004). These
groups should have representatives in the management of protected areas and participatory
mechanisms should be established for the restitution of the territories taken previously without
free and informed consent of local peoples.
In the last three decades, the global international conservation movement has sought to include
local communities in conservation in order to effectively and sustainably manage ecosystems
and species (Kothari et al. 2013; Berkes 2004). The more inclusive conservation models such
as different Integrated Conservation and Development Projects (ICDP’s) that emerged from the
1980s onwards mainly address economic incentives of local communities to protect their
environment and use it sustainably (Adams & Hutton 2007). Economic compensations and
income-generating activities can generate enthusiasm at early stages but as these rarely have
any relevance to the actual biodiversity protection and lack tangible, genuine, and long-lasting
benefits, local commitment is not likely to sustain (Pyhälä 2003). Payments for Ecosystem
Services (PES) is an approach where local resource managers are rewarded for maintaining
healthy ecosystems that also provide ecosystem services (Kosoy & Corbera 2010). The
criticism of PES concentrates on the definitions of ecosystem cervices as commodities that can
be sold and bought.  Kosoy & Corbera (2010) argue that this is technically difficult and has
implications on how people relate to nature as it undermines the complexity of ecosystems and
the multiplicity of values related to them.
Indeed, purely economic incentives presented to local communities may be too narrow,
simplistic, and insufficient in changing individual behaviour (Berkes 2004). This may be due
to the dynamics within a community, and whether it can be ensured that the benefits are shared
equitably (Kull 2002). Second, money is not necessarily enough to incentivize changes in local
behaviour;  various  social  and  political  benefits  such  as  fair  distribution  of  rights  to  access
resources may be even more important in defining forms of rural life (Berkes 2004). Miller et
al. (2014) strongly criticise the current conservation paradigm of larger environmental NGOs
for their outright utilitarian ethic that parallels with neoliberal economic philosophy with its
apparently empty assumption that increasing affluence would reduce human impacts on nature
(also Corson 2011). They argue that participation in the market economy often encourages over
exploitation of natural resources, threatening both biological and cultural diversity  as  few
traditional cultures survive the imposition of monetary and materialistic values that characterise
the modern market economy. Similarly, Hanson (2012) observes that environmental awareness
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resources and the role of human beings as an individual user or manager,  both of which are
deeply contradictory to many traditional cosmo visions.
In sum, the conservation models concentrating on economic incentives seem to be problematic
in two respects. First, if the economic activities do not have a direct link to biodiversity
conservation itself and if they are unreliable, they are unlikely to generate local commitment
for conservation. Second, the encouraged participation to market economy involves the related
world views and values of modern market economy that threaten traditional cultures and are
argued to be contradictory to conservation goals.
2.4 Community-based conservation
The newer policy initiatives that are moving away from the economic incentives thinking
include different Community-Based Conservation (CBC), Community-Based Natural
Resources Management (CBNRM) initiatives, and Indigenous Peoples’ and Local Community
Conserved Territories and Areas (ICCAs) (Kothari et al. 2013; Berkes 2004). The idea of these
approaches is to confer the management authority to local communities who are dependent on
the local ecosystems and consider them as their ancestral land.
It has been argued that local communities possess time and place specific knowledge that offers
them abilities to design more appropriate management practices than what a distant government
agency could create (Agrawal & Gibson 1999). Community-based conservation (CBC)
emerged in the 1990s and is also known as community-based natural resources management
(CBNRM). The main idea is for rural communities to manage and benefit from the natural
resources they depend on. Community-based conservation approach has further developed with
the growing literature on indigenous knowledge (e.g. Berkes 1999), and local management
institutions (e.g. Ostrom 1990).
It  has been noted that local communities wishing to maintain their  culture and rights to land
have substantial common interests with conservationists who want to protect the ecosystem for
its biodiversity (Adams & Hutton 2007). The ‘environmentalism of the poor’ states that in many
conflicts concerning large-scale resource extraction or waste disposal, poor people often
support the preservation of nature rather than industrial development (Martinez-Alier 2013).
This is because often their survival – water sources or land for grazing and agriculture – depends
on nature preservation. The ‘environmentalism of the poor’ sees the fight for human rights and
environment as inseparable while, paradoxically, often these goals have been seen as
contradictory. If local resource use rules and norms are in line with conservation goals, then
9theoretically at least conservation should work with, and even be supported and strengthened
by local institutions (Brosius & Russell 2003; Berkes 2004). However, conservation in its
modern, Western sense, is rarely the goal of local institutions, the latter of which are usually
built around the use, allocation, and management of certain resources and can therefore even
be contradictory with certain conservation goals (Berkes 2004). This may make it challenging
for conservation planners to regard local people as allies, and vice versa, as finding and defining
common objectives that would benefit both stakeholders may be difficult.
CBC  projects  have  had  their  share  of  criticism  too.  In  many  cases,  CBC  projects  have  not
succeeded in rectifying the shortcomings of ICDPs and local communities continue to bear the
harsh consequences of conservation with little participation in conservation activities (Hanson
2012). There are two views on why CBC initiatives have often failed (Berkes 2004). According
to the first view the objectives of conservation and development should be delinked; a project
with a mix of different objectives is unlikely to succeed in any of them. This search for “win-
win” solutions to the contradicting goals of conservation and poverty alleviation is difficult
because these problems are very different (Adams & Hutton 2007). There are arguments for
separating these two goals because the conventionally natural science trained conservation
planners and park managers are not prepared to tackle the structural problems such as poverty,
unequal land and resource allocation, corruption, and market failure.
According to the second view, the failure of CBC initiatives is caused by improper
implementation, not the impracticality of the concept (Berkes 2004; Wilshusen et al. 2002).
Especially devolution of authority is often insufficient for changing the subaltern position of
local communities in the face of conservation proprietors, leading to a repetition of the mistakes
of conventional, strict, top-down conservation policies. Typically short-term funded projects
often lead to short-sightedness and strive for immediate results whereas getting consent and
participation from local communities can be very time-consuming. As Brockington (2002)
points out, any shift to CBC in post-colonial settings most probably needs to evolve in the same,
rigid, institutional frameworks that previously have supported conservation that excludes local
communities from any decision-making.
Contrary evidence also exists: in their comparative analysis of CBCs worldwide, Brooks et al.
(2012) found more successes than failures in resulting attitudes and behaviours, and in
ecological and economic outcomes supporting the effectiveness of CBC. They suggest that
challenges caused by national context and local community characteristics can be overcome by
good project design and implementation.
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This chapter has presented the shifts in global conservation discourse in relation to local
communities in Global South. The more recent community-based conservation literature views
the problematic relations between conservation and local community interests as related to
sharing of power and rights, not only of economic benefits. The next chapter continues to
conceptualise the issues of power, justice, and community involvement in the governance of
natural resources.
3. Theoretical framework
This chapter presents the theoretical framework of the case study. This study uses Political
Ecology approach as it attempts to understand conservation by looking at human organisation,
distribution of power and questions of justice. Political ecology approach is presented in
Chapter  3.1.  Chapter  3.2  looks  at  conservation  from  the  point  of  view  of  legitimacy  of
governance and environmental justice, both of which suggest that the most beneficial and
ethically justifiable way of conservation governance involve strong participation of local
communities in negotiation. Public participation is further conceptualised in Chapter 3.3, and
the chapter also discusses community empowerment as a crucial factor in the success and depth
of  participation,  as  well  as  divisions  and  power  asymmetries  within  a  community  that  pose
further challenges to any participatory conservation initiative. Chapter 3.4 presents institutional
theory which attempts to understand how, then, groups of people can self-organise and take
initiative to manage their natural resources. Finally, the research questions emerging from the
presented theory are introduced in chapter 3.5.
3.1 Political ecology
Political ecology emerged in the 1970’s as a transdisciplinary field of study that looks at the
relationships between the natural and the social (Adams & Hutton 2007; Robbins 2012).
Political ecology analysis attempts to understand how landscapes come to be: i.e. what are the
mechanisms and processes by which people establish, negotiate, and contest land uses and
access to resources (Gezon 2006). The kinds of physical actions we take to shape landscapes,
or places, is inherently affected by our social constructions of what is and what could be. These
are affected by social structures at different scales, from local to regional, national, and global
(Gezon 2006).
Power in political ecology is conceptualised as “a social relation built on an asymmetrical
distribution of resources and risks” (Hornborg 2001 cited in Gezon 2006:11), an idea that offers
understanding to different kinds of environmental conflicts (Korhonen 2006). Political ecology
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analyses the environmental condition and change as a result of power relations that define an
actor’s access, use, and control over natural resources. Political ecology also inspects and
deconstructs narratives of environmental change illustrating their political dimensions (Robbins
2012). Actors at different levels, be they individuals or groups, possess different positions,
perceptions, interests, and rationalities in relation to the environment, all of which guide their
actions (Gezon 2006; Robbins 2012). Which “meanings” or ideologies become dominant is
determined in continuous power struggles among the actors who use the power they possess to
advance their ideas and interests at the same time as dominant ideas enforce the patterns of
power distribution (Robbins 2012).
In some cases, political ecology analyses have been criticised for overemphasising the social
dimension  of  the  environment  (Pollini  2010).  The  narratives  created  in  these  social-
constructivist analyses may serve the emancipatory purposes of the weak by revealing the
broader, political circumstances, but this could lead to forgetting the ecological factors. Pollini
accuses these analyses of disregarding “nature” as a distinct category for objective, scientific
examination focusing only on the representations of  nature  and  using  the  neutral  notion  of
environmental ‘change’ when ‘degradation’ would be a more accurate description. In contrast,
Gezon (2006) argues that the value of the political ecology approach is that by analysing global
processes in specific landscapes and places, it can examine the policies, ideologies, and power
structures within a material context, including biophysical aspects. Gezon states that “While
nature exists apart from the narratives about it, human treatment of it is always political”
(Gezon 2006: 194). Environmental change or degradation cannot therefore be understood as
separate from political processes.
3.2 Conservation as an element of human organisation
Nature  conservation  is  by  definition  a  social  and  political  process  –  a  matter  of  human
organisation (Brechin et al. 2002). Thus, the strength of human organisation, the commitment
and cooperation of social actors defines the success in biodiversity protection. For this reason,
Brechin et al. (2002) present that conservation planning should address elements of human
dignity (or environmental justice), legitimacy, accountability, and governance among other
things.
Governance is a broad concept regarding questions such as who decides, on what authority and
what ground rules (Brechin et al. 2002). Arrangements of decision making and power sharing
are constantly renegotiated because they are to a large extent based on legitimacy. For any
behaviour or setting to be legitimate, it needs to be defined as just, correct, and appropriate by
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the society (Weber 1978). Authority, then again, means ‘legitimate power’, the public
acceptance of a political system or ruler to use power to influence the public. Brechin et al.
(2002) emphasise the importance of negotiation and suggest that the focus should not be on
“voluntary versus enforced compliance – – but rather on fair enforcement or legitimate social
control” (Brechin et al. 2002: 46). It would be more practical and longer-lasting to negotiate
agreements that all participants approve rather than use resources to enforce reluctant, local
communities to obey rules that they view as unjust. Brechin et al. (2002) remind that rights to
equal participation and self-determination come with responsibilities. Each, equal, negotiating
party is responsible to holding up the mutually agreed rules and commitments and effectively
pursue the goals.
Brechin et al. (2002) present that promoting debate, compromise, and power sharing among
actors involved in conservation appears to be a promising route to a legitimate process but this
is only possible when human dignity and questions of environmental justice are properly
addressed. Schlosberg (2013) examines the pluralistic understandings of environmental justice.
The dimensions of environmental justice usually referred to in academic literature and by
environmental movements are equity, recognition, and participation (Schlosberg 2013). The
concerns on equity question how equally environmental risks and benefits are distributed. The
observation that the highest environmental risks are often faced by the marginalised groups of
the society raise questions of recognition: are all affected social groups recognised as
stakeholders having rights. Participation, the possibility to speak for oneself, is also seen as an
essential dimension of environmental justice (ibid.). Not surprisingly, environmental justice
discourse developed around the notion that it is most often the weakest social groups at the local
level who bear the heaviest environmental impacts but who have the least power to influence
decision-making (Schlosberg & Carruthers 2010). The discourse began with questions of
“environmental racism” in the USA, and has provided an important frame for understanding
land struggles of indigenous and local communities around the world (ibid.).
Berkes (2004) argues that in conservation, the main focus should be at the community level, as
the cooperation of local people is key to long-lasting conservation benefits. He states that
centralised management in conservation fits poorly in complex systems that involve an
interplay of actors and institutions across space and across levels of organisation. According to
the subsidiary principle, decision making and dispute solving should preferably take place at
the lowest organisational level, i.e. the local community, and government regulation should step
in only when necessary, e.g. in solving disputes between different communities or external
actors (Anderson 2000; Berkes 2004). Subsidiary principle is often used to argue for
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decentralisation of power which aims at including the whole society in decision-making
through entrusting power to representative, local authorities (Ribot et al. 2010). The next sub-
chapter looks at participation in conservation and discusses the related need for power sharing
and community empowerment.
3.3 Public participation and empowerment
Public participation is an important component of governance. Participation can be analysed
according to levels of participation, as suggested e.g. by Pretty & Smith (2004), who portray
participation along six stages or degrees presented in Table 1. The lowest (i.e. least
participatory) level is passive participation in which information goes only top-down, from the
authorities to local communities (Pretty & Smith 2004). The second level is that of consultative
participation, where information is extracted from participants. In the third level, participation
is bought from  participants  for  the  exchange  of  cash  or  material  benefits.  In functional
participation the objectives are predetermined for the participants ensuring that the goals of
external rulers are met. Interactive participation involves participants in analysis and planning,
and it strives for strengthening the local groups and institutions. And finally, self-mobilisation
means that people take initiative independently to manage their natural resources, implying that
they retain the authority to control those resources. It has been recorded that positive
conservation outcomes rarely emerge with passive, consultative, and bought types of
participation (ibid.).
Table 1. Levels of participation (Pretty & Smith 2004)
Level of participation Description
Passive participation Participants are told what has already been
decided
Consultative participation Participants answer questions posed by the
authority but are not involved in decision-
making
Brought participation Participation for food, cash, or other material
benefits
Functional participation Participation is organised by the authority to
meet predefined objectives
Interactive participation Participation in analysis, development of action
plans, and strengthening of local institutions
Self-mobilisation People take initiative independently, community
has control over resource use
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Participation of local communities in conservation initiatives has been criticised as often being
insufficient and temporary in nature and thus not creating any stable authority at the local level.
The critiques continue that top-down management often employs lowest levels of participation
(Brown 2002; see Table 1). Brown (2002) argues that the forms of participation where the
participants remain passive, are sometimes used strategically by authorities to meet calls for
community involvement but they do not help correcting power imbalances and can even
exacerbate underlying conflicts (see e.g. Castro & Neilson 2001).
Chambers defines empowerment as a “process by which people, especially poor people, are
enabled to take more control over their own lives and secure a better livelihood with ownership
of productive assets as one key element” (Chambers 1993: 11). Empowerment thus requires
ownership of resources and other assets, ownership implying also some authority to control
them. Without empowerment, decentralisation of management power would only give the local
communities new responsibilities but no rights and this would mean a deepened top-down
power (Kull 2002; Ribot 2004; Anderson 2000). There are many cases where the state has taken
local labour to its own purposes increasing the state power and control over local level (Ribot
2004). In order to effectively manage resources at the local level, the actors need to have the
authority over the three following stages (Agrawal & Gibson 1999).
1) Negotiation and definition of the rules about the use, management, and conservation of
resources. The ones having the authority over rule-making have the rights to access, use,
and conserve the resources and determine who are excluded from or included in these
activities.
2) Implementation of the rules. This is the authority over monitoring that the use happens
according to the rules.
3) Arbitration  of  disputes.  Implementation  can  result  in  different  types  of  disputes  that
must be tried to resolve. The authority over arbitration of disputes requires also rights
and capacities to order sanctions and to ensure that they are followed.
In most community-based conservation initiatives, only the second stage of authority presented
above is given to the local actors: they are given the task of implementing rules that continue
to be created and disputes resolved by government agencies (Agrawal & Gibson 1999). This
does not support community empowerment and is not a form of real decentralisation of power
(ibid.).
As the level of community empowerment appears to be a significant factor in determining the
success of participatory conservation initiatives, another important issue is the existing power
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imbalances within communities and the question how to assure equitable outcomes from
participatory conservation processes. All societies have divisions based on gender, wealth,
caste, ethnicity etc. and access to natural resources is contested between these groups (Kull
2002; Agrawal & Gibson 1999). Also in rural communities, the ways of using natural resources
can vary significantly between the wealthy and the poor, women and men, etc. Although
geographic proximity may define who are included in the use of a same resource, it does not
necessarily create unity of interest (Kull 2002).
If the conventional view of “traditional community” as a homogeneous unit is questioned, the
objectives of “empowering the locals” to manage their natural resources or “decentralizing the
management authority to a community” become problematic (Kull 2002; Agrawal & Gibson
1999;  Berkes  2004).  Who  is  the  relevant  local  authority  a  conservation  project  should
communicate with (Gezon 2006)? Which are the legitimate community institutions and do they
actually represent all community, including women, immigrants, and other groups (Kull 2002;
Gezon 2006)?
In many cases, pre-existing informal rules of social interaction create structural barriers for
certain groups to gain meaningful roles in the new, participatory, formal structures (Saito-
Jensen et al. 2010). It is possible that augmenting the power of local leaders who fail to consider
all groups of the community will only deepen the divisions in communities and lead to non-
compliance and resistance (Kull 2002; Gezon 2006). ‘Elite capture’ is a problem commonly
recognised in conservation projects and development projects in general (Ribot 2004; Saito-
Jensen et al. 2010). The more privileged members of community can dominate decision-making
and ensure their improved access to collective benefits at the expense of the others. As Gezon
(2006) points, by the choice of who to cooperate with projects can either reinforce the existing
power asymmetries or they can empower segments of population that have been marginalised.
3.4 Institutions, incentives and initiative
The  dynamics  within  community  and  the  conditions  under  which  communities  can  self-
organise to manage their natural resources are studied by scholars of common property.
Theories of common property have emerged from 1980’s onwards to challenge the “tragedy of
the commons”, an influential theory popularized by Hardin (1968), that presents that
individuals who act rationally according to their self-interest end up depleting a commonly
owned resource contrary to the interests of the whole group. This is because the benefits of
resource use are gained by the individuals whereas the negative effects of resource depletion
are experienced by the group. Often, then, the option to protect resources boils down to strong
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state control or private property rights. “New institutionalist” work of Ostrom and others has
presented contradictory cases to the “tragedy of the commons” (Ostrom 1990). By focusing on
small scale common property resources users Ostrom’s work has enlightened the institution
building in a group of people interdependent from each other’s actions asking how they can
organise and govern themselves without external assistance to guarantee long-term mutual
benefits and avoid opportunistic actions.
Institutions can be seen as the rules that shape the social life and mediate between social and
ecological systems (Berkes 2004). Institutions define the way the systems are able to learn and
adapt, reorganise, and deal with change. They are not, however stagnant constructs that are able
to force individual action always to the same form (Agrawal & Gibson 1999). Individual actions
constantly reshape institutions and they should be seen more like provisional agreements on
how to deal with things. Institutions govern social life and decision-making at the local,
national, international, and global levels and in broader political economy (Leach et al. 1999;
Folke et al. 2007). Understanding natural resource management requires analysing the
relationship among institutions at different scales of governance and between formal and
informal spheres (Leach et al. 1999). E.g. land tenure rights are often issued by Forest
Department, formally legitimised by the state, and defended in courts of law, but at the same
time contested by local communities who adhere to traditional property rights legitimised by
social norms and codes of behaviour related to their ancestral lands (ibid.).
While integration of traditional norms in conservation in post-colonial contexts is proposed to
provide non-costly, voluntary, and respectful conservation approaches (Colding & Folke 2001),
it has to be remembered that the maintenance of these informal institutions depends on the
recognition of local management authority (Ostrom 1990). One cannot assume maintaining a
set of management institutions if they become unnecessary when the real management authority
is taken by central government. National governments may help or hinder local self-
organisation but if local authority is not formally recognised it is difficult for users to establish
resource management rules (Ostrom et al. 1999).
Sufficient incentives are presented in the theory of the commons as one of the key factors
pushing individuals and groups to self-governance (Ostrom 1990). Incentives are benefits that
actors can expect to gain if they succeed to sustainably use their resources. The early approaches
of ICDPs sought to create economic incentives for conservation – often without any direct link
or mechanism between these two goals (Peters 1999).  As realised by many shortcomings of
ICDPs, the economic incentives do not automatically result in an internal initiative in  a
community. In fact, they can be even counterproductive in this respect. As described by Talbot
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(1995) in a Malian context, years of top-down governance and related development approaches
led to a situation where the overly supervised and assisted farmers where incapable of taking
initiative but only waiting for external intervention. Anticipated incentives in conservation are
found to be useful in motivating community engagement, but community self-organisation
process requires also many other factors such as leadership (one or more key people who drive
the discourse), shared views, skills, and knowledge, as well as partnerships with supportive
organizations and government (Seixas & Davy 2008).
As can be seen, community self-organisation and the development of internal initiative are
complex processes affected by many different factors. What becomes clear, however, is that
the external, ‘higher-level’ governance can have an essential supportive or restricting role
(Ostrom 1990, 1999).  It  can allow local resource users some rights based on which they can
create management institutions, or it can deny these rights risking degradation of local social
organisation and creation of local resistance to any imposed, environmental rules.
3.5 Research Questions
This case study exemplifies the issues discussed in this chapter by looking at local agency,
possibilities of involvement, and initiative in biodiversity conservation in Ranomafana National
Park. The first research question emerging from the theory presented above is:
1) How do and can local communities get involved in conservation of a national park, post-
creation?
In the first question, ‘involvement’ is firstly understood as public participation and
representation of local communities’ aspirations in decision-making. The components of PA
co-management defined at the national level (MNP 2014), their implementation, and the
resulting forms of participation are inspected through local experiences. The extent to which
authority is gained by local communities in these processes affects the extent and meaning of
participation in conservation governance (Pretty & Smith 2004; Kull 2002; Ribot 2004).
Secondly, involvement is not viewed narrowly, taking place only within the forms predefined
by the conservation authority; rather, local communities and individuals also influence
conservation through informal, and sometimes illegal, actions and arenas (Gezon 2006).
2) What kinds of social outcomes does top-down conservation have at the local level?
Following the concern raised by e.g. Kull (2002) and Berkes (2004) that conservation and
development policies often result in deepened inequalities at the community level, the second
research question inspects social outcomes of conservation. These include social and economic
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equity within and among local communities related to incentives offered and restrictions
imposed by the PA, but also the equity in getting involved: are all social groups able to
participate in co-management?
3) To what extent are local communities willing and able to manage their natural resources
and cooperate with conservation authorities?
Based on the literature presented above, the assumption is that PA governance can have a great
impact on community self-organisation and the level of participation in conservation (Ostrom
1990, 1999; Brown 2002). This is impacted e.g. by the extent to which local people’s rights are
respected (rights to equity, participation, and representation i.e. environmental justice
(Schlosberg 2013)) (Ostrom 1990, 1999). The third research question looks at local reactions
to top-down governance, and asks whether co-management actually results in some kind of
partnership or even approval by the local communities (see e.g. Brechin et al. 2002).
4. The Malagasy context and the case study
What kinds of national and local institutional arrangements govern Protected Area
management? This chapter discusses this question through a literature review presenting an
overall network of local formal and informal institutions, national institutions and global
discourses guiding conservation at the national level as well as locally in RNP.
4.1 Local institutions and traditional management practices
Traditional natural resources management in Madagascar is based on a complex system of
formal and informal institutions (Kull 2002). The imposed rules by the colonial power and the
post-colonial state co-exist with the traditional institutions to some extent (Gezon 2006), but
also the breaking down of traditional institutions has been recorded (Jones et al. 2008).
In villages, the traditional leader is called ampanjaka and he rules the village with the village
elders, rey amin-dreny (Kull 2002). These formal rulers and institutions organising the rural
Malagasy society are called fanjakana aside  of  which  the fokonalona, i.e. the traditions and
customs, serve as informal rules and norms (Elmqvist et al. 2007). The informal agreements
and management of natural resources at the village level is based on both fanjakana and
fokonalona. According to Gezon (2006), rural governance and handling of disputes in
Madagascar takes place within diffuse settings of multiple, overlapping sources of authority. In
her study villages near a PA in Northern Madagascar, she found that kinship, regional and
national legislation, and foreign development and conservation imperatives all provide frames
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that guide local behaviour, impose some understandings of the world, and define commitments
to different social arrangements (Gezon 2006). Gezon (2006) observed rural people adhering
to several of these frames simultaneously.
Traditional, local environmental knowledge has become a centre of interest for much research
seeking  for  informal  institutions  that  govern  the  use  of  wild  species.  One  form  of  such
traditional institutions are taboos that exist in most cultures around the world and include social
norms enforced by social pressure or fear for supernatural retribution (Colding and Folke 2001).
In Madagascar, the system of fadys forms this kind of a set of informal institutions that (at least
the ones related to natural resource use) can encourage sustainable harvesting practices
(Colding & Folke 2001; Jones et al. 2008). It has been argued that traditional institutions can
effectively provide conservation benefits when the capacity of the state to enforce conservation
rules is limited (Colding and Folke 2001). In addition, Jones et al. (2008) state that by
integrating informal institutions in conservation, synergies with conservation objectives can be
found and local people’s roles in conservation can be more fairly acknowledged.
Research by Jones et al. (2008) in villages neighbouring Ranomafana National Park, the context
of  this  case  study,  found fadys that offer significant protection to at least five endangered
species, among several other endemic species of birds, mammals, and plants. To mention one
example, a fady that forbids commercial harvesting of crayfish has resulted in protection of a
very rare endemic crayfish species. Jones et al. (2008) found fadys governing the timing and
method of harvesting wild species that originate from an attempt to sustainably manage natural
resources. The variety of very specific fadys also indicate the high level of environmental
knowledge  the  rural  people  have.  Jones  et  al.  (2008)  also  observe  the  breaking  down  of
traditional mechanisms that regulate resource extraction where people have lost the right to
manage the resources. Tompon-tany is a Malagasy concept indicating ownership and
stewardship of land, and with losing this status to RNP they also lost the authority to regulate
their own resource use and to exclude other actors from the forests (ibid.). The results, recorded
by Jones et al. (2008), are breaking down of fadys and anger towards RNP authorities, expressed
for instance in the form of intentional killing of endangered animals that traditionally are
secured by fadys. In villages that have community-managed forests, fadys  were  found to  be
more stable (ibid.).
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4.2 Conservation and narratives of environmental change in Madagascar
According to the conventional, colonial narrative, Madagascar has once been covered with a
uniform, evergreen forest that has been gradually destroyed as a result of human settlement on
the island (Pollini 2010). This idea gave justification to the repression of traditional land uses
and is still influential among decision-makers and conservation actors. The more recent
research by paleobotanists, archaeologists, and palaeontologists challenges the vision of totally
forested island proposing that the pre-human vegetation of Madagascar was a mosaic of
savannahs, forests, and grassland (Pollini 2010). However the research also shows that the
human settlement on the island increased the environmental change and that the existing forests
are but small degraded remnants of what there once was (Figure 1).
The French colonial rule since 1896 has been seen as an important factor in breaking down of
the local forms of forest management that once existed (Peters 1999). The most fertile land of
the island was appropriated by French and Chinese plantation owners for irrigated rice, banana,
Figure 1. Forests of Madagascar and location of Ranomafana National Park.
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and especially coffee production. The residents of these lands were forced to leave and they
moved to the uninhabited areas of the island and began cultivating upland forested slopes for
subsistence (ibid.). This expanded and accelerated the practice of tavy further in the forest areas.
Tavy is the Malagasy name for traditional slash and burn agriculture. It is a key agro-pastoral
tool for traditional farmers and herders in Madagascar as in many other tropical countries
(ibid.).
For colonial rulers, fire represented backward techniques threatening forests and plantations,
and conservationists joined the concern for Madagascar’s unique species and habitat loss (Kull
2004). Consequently, since 1913 the French colonial power criminalised burning with both
rhetoric and repressive tools: all dry-season burning was criminalised, heavy anti-deforestation
regulations put in practice, and the villages relocated several times (ibid.). This resulted in mass
revolts and resistance and actually accelerated tavy and deforestation (Kull 2002, Peters 1999).
The resistance against fire restrictions by the Malagasy peasants took advantage of the
anonymity of released fire as well as the administrative contradictions and has been successful
for a century in spite of the continuous anti-fire campaigns and legislation. Fire became a
weapon of peasants’ everyday resistance; it became a symbol of independence and fight against
the  French  colonialism  and  is  today  used  to  express  dissatisfaction  with  the  state  policies
(Pollini 2010). There are recorded examples of indigenous peoples in Madagascar deciding that
they rather see their forest destroyed than in the hands of foreigners; as soon as forest belonged
to the colonial power, local communities either stopped taking care of it or even intentionally
burnt it (Pollini 2010).
Peters (1999) states that the contemporary conservation strategies in Madagascar face the same
difficulties and resistance as a century ago since their prohibitive legislation is seen by the local
populations in the historical context as an analogy of the ban on tavy. The anti-fire discourse
persists among the country’s urban elites, the state, and external agencies, while tavy continues
to be a symbol of freedom and resistance for the rural population (Kull 2002). Fairhead and
Leach describe in their book Misreading the African Landscape (1996) how a hundred years of
repression and anti-fire rhetoric in forest-savannah mosaic areas has created difficulties for
communication between the state and the people. The anti-fire campaigning has reached even
the most remote parts of the country. This has led to unspoken (but also unresolved) tensions
between the national government and local populations, whose livelihoods continue to depend
on opening up new land for cultivation with the use of tavy. Communication is often blocked
as well: authorities have limited knowledge of local level realities, and local rural people are
often unaware of the actual content of the national laws.
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4.3 The failed National Environmental Action Plan
Conservation in Madagascar was directed since 1991 by the National Environmental Action
Plan (EAP) (Hanson 2012; Pollini 2010). The plan was guided by a comity composed of state,
NGO, and donor actors. It composed of three phases, each of which included efforts to deepen
the participation of local communities in conservation. The first phase (1991–1997) introduced
integrated conservation and development initiatives (ICDP) and the second (1997–2003)
community-based natural resources management (CBNRM) approaches including the
contractual forest management law GELOSE. Under this law, community associations
(COBAs) were established to make agreements with the Malagasy Forest Service and
municipalities that granted certain management rights to the association. The third phase
primarily focused on increasing the protected area of Madagascar according to the “Durban
Vision” announced in 2003 by President Ravalomanana. While the new System of Protected
Area legislation attempted to allow closer cooperation for conservation planners and local
community associations it also gave substantial amount of power to the forest service, foreign
conservation organizations and mining interests (Corson 2011). These agents were thus given
a greater authority over land-use decisions further disregarding the aspirations of rural
communities. Each phase was heavily criticised and in the end, after 15 years and 450 million
USD spent, by most accounts the EAP had failed to significantly reduce deforestation and land
degradation causing negative impacts to the local populations (Pollini 2010).
The EAP ended in 2008, and in 2009 – with the coup d’état by Andry Rajoelina – the country
entered into a political turmoil, leading to the cutting of all the international financing of
Madagascar National Parks, the agency administrating all Madagascar’s protected areas
(Hanson 2012; Director of RNP 2014, personal communication). After this the country has seen
the rise of market-based mechanisms aimed at conservation, seeking benefits through the
creation of market values for ecosystem services. Conservation in Madagascar continues to be
controlled by elites and foreigners and remains far from being a democratic process (Hanson
2012).
4.4 The case study: Ranomafana National Park
The Ranomafana National Park (RNP) is situated in Ranomafana region of Fianarantsoa
province in the mountainous range of eastern Madagascar (see Figure 1). The national park
covers 43,500 hectares of tropical rainforest in the topographically diverse landscape, with
altitudes varying between 400 to 1,374 metres above sea level (Korhonen 2006). The forest of
Ranomafana region is estimated to provide habitat for around 2000 endemic species and
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numerous species still unknown to science making it a priority area for both research and
conservation.
The human settlement in Ranomafana region started around the late 18th and early 19th
centuries (Peters 1999). The area and its residents have been ruled by the Merina monarchy, the
French colonisation (1897–1958) and currently the independent Malagasy state. Currently,
there are about 160 villages that are divided into 35 fokotanys within five kilometres of RNP’s
borders. The fokotany is  the  lowest  official  administrative  unit  below  the commune rurale:
serving on average 400–1200 citizens (Kull 2002). The human population in Ranomafana area
consists  of  two self-identified  cultural  groups,  the  Tanala  and  Betsileo,  of  which  the  Tanala
inhabit low lands east and the Betsileo the highlands west from the National Park (Peters 1999).
As the topography of the eastern region is very steep, fertile low land for rice paddy is limited
making traditional upland slash and burn method (tavy) very important for local food
production. Tavy is also an important part of the Tanala culture and fombandrazana, the “way
of the ancestors”. The Betsileos on the western side of the park seldom practise tavy due to the
less steep landscape. They also tell that the forest area is increasing since their ancestors stopped
burning practices.
4.4.1 History of RNP
RNP has a core area that is meant to be strictly preserved for biodiversity conservation, and
where human impact is minimised. This core area is surrounded by a buffer zone which can be
used for different purposes, namely eco-tourism, research and habitat restoration (MNP 2014).
The buffer zone also serves as a protecting shield around the core areas of the park. The 2.5 km
wide  buffer  zone  is  controlled  by  the  Chef  Forestier  who  works  in  collaboration  with
Madagascar National Parks (MNP) who manages all national parks of the country. Both the
Chef Forestier and MNP operate under the Ministry of Environment and Forests.
The RNP project (RNPP) started with the discovery of the Golden Bamboo lemur,  a species
that was thought to have gone extinct. The species was discovered in the Ranomafana area in
1986 by a primate researcher group led by Doctor Patricia Wright (Korhonen 2006). The RNPP
was thus established in 1991 as an integrated conservation-development program (ICDP)
aligned with the national Environmental Action Plan (Peters 1998; Hanson 2012). It was funded
by USAID, organized by two U.S. universities, and authorised by the Malagasy government.
The project’s six components were park management, biodiversity research, ecotourism,
conservation education, rural development and health. Environmental awareness raising (or
“sensibilisation” in French) is an important part of the community outreach program that began
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with RNPP and continues to be implemented by the ValBio Research Centre located within
RNP (Hanson 2012).
In 1997 the RNPP tasks were shifted to ANGAP (Association Nationale pour la Gestion des
Aires Protégées), responsible of park management, conservation education, rural development
and  promotion  of  ecotourism,  and  MICET  (Madagascar institute pour la Conservation des
Ecosystemes Tropicaux) facilitating biodiversity research and health projects (Korhonen-Kurki
2006). Later, ANGAP changed its name to Madagascar National Parks (MNP).
Despite the great amount of effort and funding put into development of rural communities – as
well as various benefits brought to the local economy (Wright & Andriamihaja 2003) – the
ICDP of RNP has been much criticized (Hanson 2012). The main critique concerns the
centralised planning that lacked the effort to understand or address the local social, cultural and
economic conditions and people’s ties to the land (Hanson 2012; Peters 1999). Peters, the
Conservation Technical Advisor to the RNPP, describes the creation of the national park as a
confusing event for the 160 local villages: many of the remote villages around the park
remained unvisited by government agents and few of them were aware of the creation of the
park, let alone its purpose or meaning (Peters 1999). Many thought that it was another attempt
by foreigners to steal their land. The initial conservation approach lacked any official
recognition of resident peoples’ rights to self-determination, as well as any public debate, and
these shortcomings exacerbated the already marginalised position of rural communities (ibid.).
The inability of conservation authorities to address these and other socio-economic issues
arising from conservation at the local level and to adapt to contextual changes (i.e. in laws,
policies, and socioeconomic forces) inhibited the success of Ranomafana ICDP (Hanson 2012).
Development activities that have followed the initial ICDP model have not been successful, as
development projects are imposed by the conservation authorities and local participation
remains low (Korhonen 2006). The ideology behind the activities or personnel implementing
them has not changed from ICDPs (Korhonen 2006; Hanson 2012).
4.4.2 Historical impacts of conservation
The main benefits of conservation for local communities are ecological: watershed protection
and favourable micro-climate (Kari & Korhonen-Kurki 2013). The restrictions however have
caused a substantial decrease in household income (Ferraro 2002) meaning that ultimately it is
the rural and already food-insecure communities that end up paying the highest price for global
conservation benefits (Kari & Korhonen-Kurki 2013). However, Ferraro observed in 2002 that
relative to the national and global benefits, the costs borne by local people are relatively small
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and that the imbalance should not be impossible to rectify with proper conservation planning.
Since 1993, attempts were made to compensate the local losses resulting from conservation
with  the  50  %  DEAP  (Droit d’Entrée aux Aires Protégées) system (Lappalainen 2002).
According to the system, half of the entrance fees of the NP were given to local community
development initiatives, such as for the building of schools or health clinics (MNP 2014). This
system was suspended in 2009 due to the financial difficulties of MNP and the sudden decrease
in the number of tourists, due to national political unrest. The MNP (2014) estimates the success
of these community projects financed by 50 % DEAP to be rather low.
The protected area system has also failed in securing land tenure for peasants of Ranomafana
region who have been threatened by continuously changing legislation (Peters 1999).
Participating in ICDP activities has had no subsequent economic success of the villagers, nor
has it created incentives for villagers to diversify their land use or better manage their forest
resources (Korhonen-Kurki 2006; Peters 1999). Ecotourism has provided employment only for
a few, having little effect on local livelihoods (Sarrasin 2013). Local people continue to depend
on subsistence agriculture and forest products they are able to collect, often illegally (Kari &
Korhonen-Kurki 2013). Meanwhile, the fast population growth continues to increase the
pressure on land and resources, with cultivations expanding to new areas, except where no
longer possible due to imposed park borders.
The local rural population of  RNP continues  to  struggles  in  the  face  of  poverty,  poor  heath,
malnutrition, lack of education, and inefficient and inappropriate agricultural methods (CVB
2013). Local people recognize the problem of population growth and worry that they will be
facing a food crisis in the future (Uotila 2013). RNP has indirectly had a negative effect on
people’s health due to declined purchasing power for medicines (Korhonen 2006). Health in
remote villages in RNP was found to be poorer than in Ranomafana centre and along the main
road (ibid.). Although decreasing the number of children has been one of the central goals of
local health programs, this has not translated to the villagers as, on the contrary, reproductive
health has worsened since the establishment of the RNP (Korhonen 2006).
The conservation rules that have restricted assets such as cultivable land and banned traditional
livelihood activities (tavy) have hit hard, especially for those who are already in a weaker
position: i.e. the remote, landless, and asset-poor peasants (Korhonen 2006). Long-term
vulnerability threatens to push these people further into the margins of society, with
development projects doing little if anything to improve their situation. This increasing
vulnerability and inequality may partly have contributed to the wider social change of
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weakening the fokolona (informal community institutions) which to date has been an important
form of social capital offering people security during hard times.
According to most accounts (Korhonen 2006; Peters 1999; Hanson 2012) the attempt to
integrate conservation and development has in reality had the opposite effect: the conservation
goals and the needs of the local people seem to be in ever deeper contradiction. Biologists and
national park personnel find the local practices of tavy, forest grazing, and natural resources
extraction as the most severe threats to biodiversity (Peters 1999). Meanwhile, local
vulnerability has increased and traditional institutions of natural resource management are
breaking down – both processes accelerating unsustainable land-use practices, thereby forming
a vicious cycle.
4.4.3 National park co-management
The MNP Strategic Management Plan for the years 2014–2024 envisions a range of ways in
which  the  PAs  are  to  bring  benefits  to  the  local  economy  (MNP  2014).  Community
development projects address issues from private sector development to education and health,
and are defined as a part of co-management and promoted by MNP’s partner organisations. The
main source of direct financial benefits that local communities can get from conservation are
salaries paid either for stable local employees of MNP or occasional paid labour of community
committee members (Committee Locale de la Protection,  CLP)  in  different  tasks  such  as
patrols, ecological monitoring, and trail maintenance (MNP 2014). Other sources include fees
paid by tourists to guides and possible micro-project funds. The Strategic Management Plan
envisions also new sources of income in development of local businesses supported by MNP
and private sector development specialists and concentrated mainly in tourism services or
production of cash crops. “Social compensation payments” or “social and environmental
safeguard plans” (PSSE) are referred to as a source of income for local communities (MNP
2014). A social safeguard plan compensating the lost resources for local populations is required
from all protected area initiatives in a 2003 directive by the Government of Madagascar.
However, its implementation is not further discussed in the Strategic Management Plan.
The MNP Strategic Management Plan for the years 2014–2024 presents that co-management
has been used as the approach of MNP for more than two decades. Co-management is defined
as collaborative management of parks with representative bodies (Comité d’Orientation et de
Suivi des Aires Protégées, COSAP) of which the majority of members should come from local
communities (MNP 2014). Governance of each national park should integrate local stakeholder
interests, and the local communities should be regarded as the primary stakeholders of
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conservation. The progress in co-management is measured with following indicators in the
Plan:
i) Percentage of COSAP members representing local communities.
ii) Percentage area of the protected area patrolled by CLPs.
iii) Percentage of protected area boundary abutted by community-managed natural resource
areas.
iv) Direct financial benefits accrued by neighbouring populations (MNP 2014).
These guidelines for cooperation with local communities define the ways conservation
authorities are supposed to build a partnership with local communities after the decades of top-
down conservation. In chapter 6, these arrangements are compared with the results of the
analysis of the field data in order to enlighten the ways they are experienced by and effects they
have on local communities.
5. Field-level data collection
The field work was conducted in November – December 2014 in Ranomafana region and was
funded by the Madagascar project of the Global Change and Conservation team from the
University of Helsinki, who also held an exchange field course titled “RESPECT” (Reserve
Planning in the Tropics). The RESPECT course conducted three focus groups in one of the
villages of this study, which provided some data also for this research. Before the expeditions
to the villages, I tested my questions in the village of Ambodiaviavy, where a focus group was
conducted. The five study villages were chosen based on logistical, temporal, and safety
limitations – no statistical sampling based on e.g. the distance to RNP or other criteria was
possible.  Two to  four  days  were  spent  in  each  study  village  as  well  as  one  afternoon in  the
village of Ambatolahy. The research group consisted of a minimum of three and maximum of
six researchers and a guide from CVB who facilitated the research team’s entry and stay with
local communities and related practicalities.
5.1 Methods of data collection and analysis
Methodologically this research draws from qualitative ethnographic approaches. Qualitative
methods are used when the goal of research is to understand the world through interpreting the
actions, perceptions, and meanings of its actors (Brockington & Sullivan 2003). Importantly,
these understandings are created in interaction with the actors and context of the research; the
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researcher does not try to stay as an objective outsider and observer but seeks to participate and
empathise with the researched. Qualitative research goes beyond numbers and quantitative
findings to find out the subjective experiences and meanings given to and impacted by social
structures (ibid.). Accordingly, in this case study, the residents of a few specific villages
scattered around the PA are talked with about their subjective experiences and perceptions of
conservation policy and natural resources management at the local level in order to create a
wider understanding of the impacts of conservation policy on local people’s agency and
involvement in conservation. The aim is to create information for conservation planners on how
to enhance co-operation with local communities at least in Ranomafana and Madagascar.
Qualitative data collection methods include e.g. participant observation, interviews, and group
discussions, providing data for analysis with methods varying from discourse analysis to
qualitative content analysis (Brockington & Sullivan 2003). The data obtained with qualitative
methods is usually in the form of quotations (interviews), descriptions (observation), and
excerpts of documents which are employed to create a narrative description (Genzuk).
Qualitative research tends to inductively build theories from observations rather than test
theories. The quality of qualitative research is assessed e.g. by the completeness of descriptions,
saturation of categories, and consistency of interpretations by different researchers in similar
cases (Seale et al. 2004).
Ethnography has been developed by sociologists and anthropologists to study people's
experiences of everyday life, emphasising social and cultural processes that should be studied
in their unique time and space (Crang & Cook 2007). The important, critical observations in
the evolution of ethnography include, firstly, that cultural structures would somehow exist
independent from the everyday actions where they in fact are produced, reproduced, and
transformed. Similarly, the people being researched cannot be expected to have only one
cultural identity similar to the others in the same social group. And finally, the interpretations
of individuals and cultures cannot be drawn by a researcher, apparently detached and objective
describing a culture or a social group as a homogenous entity. Ethnographic research offers the
possibility to acknowledge all these complexities of the inconsistent, contradictory, and messy
social world understanding that “research on social relations is made out of social relations”
(Crang & Cook 2007: 9). Engaging with the messiness of the real world and recognising
ambivalence and inconsistency as real and important rather than trying to find a single truth and
simplifying social world in neat theories is one of the strengths of ethnography in trying to
understand human behaviour (Crang & Cook 2007: 14). This cultural sensitivity of the
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researcher makes the ethnographic approach especially applicable in an environment and
culture unfamiliar for the researcher.
The field-level data collection methods of this research include semi-structured interviews with
residents (n=44) and key informants (n=5) of the study villages, village meetings (n=5), focus
group discussions (n=3), observations, and expert interviews (n=5). The interviews and group
meetings were conducted in Malagasy with the translation carried out principally by the
research team’s assistant Tafita Rakotoarimanana with frequent help from Maria Hariniaina,
two  Masters  Students  from  the  University  of  Antananarivo.  With  the  help  of  two  common
languages (English and French), the communication between researcher, translators, and
informants flowed well. I was not able to record the interviews but thanks to the fluent French
in which the interviews were translated and the extra time for writing while the next questions
was translated in Malagasy, I had time to write whole sentences and include details in my notes.
After the interviews I was able to ask for any necessary clarifications from the translator and
we could discuss the problems of interpretation. Some difficulties in translation were identified
and the impact of these minimized, including some data having to be dropped due to being too
unreliable.
Asking for a free prior informed consent (FPIC) from the potential participants of any research
is an increasingly common procedure carried out principally for ethical reasons (Brockington
&  Sullivan  2003).  Free  prior  informed  consent  means  that  a  person  has  the  right  to  decide
whether or not they want to take part in a research project once they have been informed of the
aims and processes of the research project, how the results will be used, and who will be able
to access them. The researcher must provide this information to the possible participants who
must be able to ask questions or withdraw from the research at any time. The consent can be
obtained in written or oral form. It must also be remembered that following such predefined
protocols does not mean that no ethical problems will arise as the research process evolves.
Dealing with ethical issues requires both awareness and flexibility throughout the process. In
this case, a research permit was requested before arriving to the village and in the village
meeting in the beginning of the visit we introduced ourselves and our research plans and asked
for consent of the villagers to participate in our research. Each individual interviewee was asked
for their consent, and we explained the voluntary nature of participation and anonymity of any
information published.
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5.1.1 Village meetings and focus groups
A focus group is a group discussion around a pre-defined topic the purpose being to learn from
the ways in which people discuss in addition to the information on the topic itself (Brockington
& Sullivan 2003). The logic of using group discussions is to find out how people act in social
contexts, i.e. how they discuss their experiences and thoughts in an interaction with other people
(Crang & Cook 2007). The challenge of group discussions is whether a researcher is able to
understand the group dynamics. In this research, this problem was inevitable due to the foreign
language and culture and therefore the meetings were used principally to get an idea of the
general, public perception towards the National Park and forest conservation and to identify the
main issues in the concerned villages regarding conservation and use of natural resources that
could be further discussed in individual interviews.
Figure 2. Village meeting in the school building of Amboditanimena
Arriving in each of the five villages, the first thing carried out was a village meeting, the purpose
of which was a mutual introduction and asking the consent of the villagers to participate to our
researches. In Tanala villages the king of the village was always present and performed the
required rituals. In the village meeting I could also pose some general questions. In most village
meetings, many people came and participated in the discussion. In one village, three focus
groups were conducted by “RESPECT” field course with men, women, and elders separately.
The objectives of the focus groups were to gather information on the social-ecological changes,
to explore the establishment of informal institutions governing the use of wildlife, and to
understand the local perceptions towards conservation. A separate village meeting was not
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necessary or even possible due to time limitations, but I was able to follow one focus group
discussion and get notes and oral descriptions from the other two.
5.1.2 Semi structured interviews
Interviewing is a key method of qualitative data collection (Crang and Cook 2007: 60–89). It
fits well as a method in this research as interviews enable the researcher to gain understandings
of the experiences, meanings, and subjectivities of the informants as discussed by themselves
and, importantly, with the researcher. A conversation between the interviewee and myself
allows for constructing intersubjective understandings of the meanings they give to rules,
events, and social relations related to conservation and natural resource management; the type
of information that cannot be ‘extracted’ and understood without a meaningful involvement of
the researcher.
Semi-structured or in-depth interviewing is often used in ethnographic research because it is a
more flexible method of data collection than predetermined questionnaires (Crang and Cook
2007). A checklist of key topics predefined with background research is used to ensure that no
important topic is forgotten to discuss and that there is some equivalence across all the
interviews (ibid.). The extent to which each topic is discussed and which features emphasised,
however, remains the choice of the interviewee, which gives some power to the interviewee in
this type of inquiry that otherwise might easily repeat the existing power structures (ibid.). In
this case, the literature review indicates to a strong top-down governance and the blocked
communication from local communities to authorities and conservation personnel and in order
to break this obstacle the attempt was to try to understand the local realities by letting as much
power  as  possible  to  the  interviewees  and  following  along  with  the  shifting  topics  of  the
conversations.
In this type of approach the creation of trust and sufficient sensitivity are fundamental (Crang
and Cook 2007; Silverman 2005). In order to get insights to the everyday realities, perceptions,
and experiences of the interviewee, trust must be created. Especially in the case where the
research topic itself is relatively sensitive, it cannot be assumed that people want to share their
true opinions and experiences with an outsider who might even be working for the local
authorities (Crang and Cook 2007). Another issue is the skills of the researcher to read the
discussion, ask the right questions at the right time, and be patient and aware of the whole
situation (Crang and Cook 2007). This includes cultural awareness: questions such as how to
approach people and what is appropriate to ask. While careful preparation is important, it is
both an advantage and challenge of the method that the discussion can change to any direction
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as new topics arise, new people happen to join the conversation, and so on. The checklist of
questions can be continually modified according to new information that is accumulated (ibid.).
Household interviews
I visited in total 44 houses in the study villages and interviewed at least one adult member of
the household. The houses were selected randomly but from each part of the village as
sometimes the houses were scattered. No other specific selection criteria was employed as many
houses  happened  to  be  empty  or  sometimes  their  residents  were  too  busy  or  unwilling  to
participate. The women were easier to meet because the men spent the days usually working at
the fields while women stayed home. This study has no significant gender perspective but,
nevertheless, it was ensured that the data is not biased in this sense by trying to get as equal
amount as possible of male and female informants. I asked key guiding questions from my
thematic checklist and let the interviewees talk themselves as much as they were willing to,
with my involvement in asking further questions only when sensed as useful, e.g. for trying to
dig as deep as possible into the issues they viewed as important. The interviews took
approximately 20–40 minutes each, although on a few occasions they lasted almost an hour as
the interviewee had so much they wanted to share.
Themes discussed in the interviews include the following:
· Social-ecological changes that have occurred in the area (discussed with older
interviewees)
· Impacts of RNP on the interviewee’s life
· Perception of RNP
· Involvement in development projects and community associations
· Perception of development and conservation projects
· Rules (formal and informal) and actors related to conservation and natural resources
management
· Perception of conservation (benefits, negative effects, possible internal and external
conflicts)
· Livelihoods, agricultural methods
Key informant interviews
In each village I interviewed a key informant, a person who was respected in the village and
who had wider knowledge about the events of the village and who could explain the relationship
with authorities and other external actors. Usually the key informant was identified in the
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village meeting and in some villages I had several chances to talk with him and ask further
explanations to things that had come up in household interviews. I also used the same themes
with the key informants as in household interviews.
Expert interviews
In addition to the data collection in the villages, different experts were discussed with in order
to gain a wider understanding of the interplay of actors involved with conservation as well as
to enlighten local cultural and political context. The expert interviewees and the purpose of the
discussions are presented in Table 2.
Table 2. Summary of expert interviews.
Date
Organisation and position of the
interviewee Purpose of the interview
6 Nov 2014
CVB, Coordinator of Monitoring and
Partnerships Department
Introduction to the area,
current events and conflicts
10 and 25 Nov 2014
CVB, Coordinator of conservation education
& Outreach Department
Environmental education and
agricultural training programs
of CVB; Cultural challenges
of conservation
26 Nov 2014 Ranomafana National Park, Director
Policy of RNP,
RNP's relation to local
communities
26 Nov 2014
Association of Guides of RNP (Association
des Guides de RNP), President and a
Member
How does the RNP benefit
local people?
28 Nov 2014 Gendarmerie of Vohiparara, Chief officer
Cooperation of gendarmerie
with MNP and local
associations
The quality and quantity of
illegal activities
All but one were individual interviews; two people (the president and a member of the
association) were interviewed from the Association of Guides of RNP. The interviews took
about 30–60 minutes and they were conducted in the workplaces of the interviewees except one
in the home of the interviewee. Only the interview with the Gendarmerie was translated to
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Malagasy, others spoke either English or French. Each interview had a slightly adapted list of
questions due to the very different roles of the stakeholders, and new topics and questions
emerged during the interviews. Some questions were rather sensitive and I did not get answers
to all of them. The expert interviews are used as complementary information for the analysis.
5.1.3 Observation
Observation is a key method of ethnographic research because it allows the researcher to
experience living within the community and culture and experiencing the everyday-life realities
that are the focus of the research. The verb “observe” has a connotation of external monitoring
whereas “participatory observation” refers to be embedded in the life of the researched
community as intimately as possible and feel what it is like to be a part of the group (Genzuk).
However, Genzuk argues that this is not a clear cut division or even a choice that a researcher
can necessarily make: the extent of participation is a continuum in which it is possible to engage
in “doing” and sometimes only watch what others do. While the amount of time spent in the
research site tends to determine how deeply one is able to participate, Crang and Cook (2007)
point that also a short period of observation can produce valuable understandings to contribute
to the analysis. In this research, the time spent in the field was limited and not entirely
determined by the researcher, meaning that the experience of what it is like to live for a
prolonged time in the community was not possible. Nonetheless, although short, the time spent
in the villages, planting rice, interacting with people, and seeing them interact among
themselves, contributed to a fuller understanding of some of the realities and constraints of local
life.
5.1.4 Summary of the data
The summary of the data gathered in Ranomafana region is presented in Table 3. All the data
is mainly qualitative except some figures from the documents of the outreach program of CVB
which are only used as general background information. Household interviews are the principal
bulk of data complemented with the views from the various group meetings and key informant
interviews, and observation that further enlighten local perceptions and dynamics between
actors. Expert interviews were used to understand the context of the case study and the
viewpoints of different actors more broadly.
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Table 3. Summary of the data gathered in November–December 2014.
Method Sample size Data type Purpose
Household
interviews 44 qualitative
Local perceptions on RNP, forest,
livelihoods, socio-ecological change,
development projects, environmental
laws, relationship with authorities
Village meetings 5 qualitative
Meeting the villagers, introducing
myself and the research, important
issues in the concerned village
Key informant
interviews 5 qualitative
Conservation initiatives in the
community, relationship with different
authorities
Focus groups of
“RESPECT” field
course
3 qualitative Perceptions of conservation in thevillage of Ranovao
Expert interviews 5 qualitative Viewpoints of different actors involvedwith conservation
Documents of CVB
Outreach program
Annual
reports 2006,
2010
qualitative /
quantitative
General information of the villages,
number of habitants. Additional
information on environmental and
socio-economic conditions of the
villages.
Observation continuous qualitative
Complementing understanding of the
way of life and spatial context, verifying
interviews (incl. planting rice, walking
around cultivations and community
forests etc., spending time in villages)
5.1.5 Qualitative content analysis
The data gathered in the study villages was analysed using Qualitative Content Analysis (QCA).
QCA  is  a  useful  tool  for  analysing  a  large  amount  of  qualitative  data,  as  it  allows  for  a
systematic  way  of  organising  the  data  for  grasping  what  has  been  said  about  the  topics  in
question, and by this process moving into a more abstract level of interpretation (Schreier 2012,
Bazeley 2013).  Coding is a fundamental  function of QCA (Bazeley 2013).  It  is  a process of
sorting and arranging the data by interpreting its meanings. This makes it possible to manage
the data and access the evidence. The coding process also stimulates thinking and helps to build
ideas from the data.
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Codes can serve many purposes: they can be descriptive, topical or analytical (Bazeley 2013).
All three code types were used in this analysis; codes were used to label the topics discussed,
the attitudes and meanings associated with these topics, and more analytical remarks or
conclusions made on the data. As a code was applied to new paragraphs of the transcript, the
already coded text was reviewed to make sure that the idea of the contents match. Writing
memos on the exact definitions of the codes helped distinguish them from each other and
pushed forward the process of analytical thinking. In the end the whole dataset was reviewed
several times by repeatedly splitting and combining different codes. This revision process lasted
throughout the analysis and broader categories of codes and more conceptual understandings
started to emerge. The final number of codes turned out to be 181, which in turn were arranged
under 23 broader themes and further elaborated in the next chapter.
In  this  case,  data  collection  set  out  initially  from a  predefined  list  of  specified  themes  to  be
discussed. The analysis, in turn, attempted not to follow a set of topics predefined in the
theoretical framework but rather to sort out what exactly emerged in the data itself. The aim
was to understand what the important phenomena related to conservation are in the realities of
local  communities.  I  would  argue  this  approach  to  have  had  certain  benefits  in  this  type  of
question setting: following the stories told by the interviewees and systematically coding all
topics opened an understanding for a wide range of overlapping and sometimes contradictory
actors, norms, rules, events, and attitudes related to conservation and especially to natural
resources management and land struggles at large, not only related to the protected area
management (see especially Chapters 5.2 and 5.3). QCA also served well for bringing up the
variety of meanings held by informants rather than counting frequencies and emphasising the
importance of topics that were mentioned most times.
5.2 Study area
The attempt when choosing the study villages was to get both Betsileo and Tanala villages and
degrees of remoteness to RNP and to Ranomafana village, the administrative centre. However,
no statistical sampling could be performed because the villages were chosen based on logistical,
temporal,  and  safety  limitations  and  some  of  the  planned  villages  were  changed  during  the
fieldwork as the conditions changed. For these reasons, the most remote northern and southern
villages were not reached and therefore this research does not ultimately provide for any
comparisons related to distance to the RNP or administrative centre.
Representativeness of the villages in terms of involvement in the governance of the PA is
perhaps difficult to assess. In qualitative research, however, the value of the research is not
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measured by the quantity of the data or statistical logic of sampling but the quality and
positionality of the information that the participants of a research can offer and quality of
interpretation from an often small number of cases (Seale et al. 2004; Eskola & Suoranta 1998;
Crang & Cook 2007). What is significant is the findings about the nature of a process, and
whether this can be generalised is not solely a question of the amount of units of data collection
(Seale et al. 2004). Saturation, the point when no new answers emerge in interviews, was
reached in two of the study villages when there was enough time for many interviews. For this
reason,  the  data  gathered  in  all  the  villages  is  analysed  mostly  as  a  unit  with  only  some
comparisons. In the end, however, each village is distinct, each with a different cultural and
spatial context, containing a range of actors and narratives, and capturing this
heterogeneousness concerning conservation and PA management is one of the goals of this
study.
Figure 3. Study villages around Ranomafana National Park.
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The locations of the study villages are indicated in Figure 3. The five main study villages are
Manokoakora, Amboditanimena, Vohiparara, Ranovao, and Torotosy. An additional study
village is Ambatolahy where only a village meeting was held but the data of which were
included in the analysis. Although the PA separates the Eastern and Western villages from each
other, local people can still travel through it on foot or by the main road. ValBio research centre
(CVB) and the village of Ranomafana are located along the national road 25. Ranomafana
village is the administrative centre of the region, where the offices of MNP, the mayor, and
many NGO’s are found. All nature tours are booked in Ranomafana, providing for many
business opportunities and hence also an increasing number of services, like restaurants,
hostels, and souvenir shops in the centre of the village.
Table 4 presents the main characteristics of the study villages and a short description of what
kind of forest is closest to each village, further discussed below.
Table 4. The main characteristics of the study villages (Number of habitants, CVB 2013)
Name No of habitants Social group Nearest forest
Manokoakora 550 Tanala
No forest near the
village
Amboditanimena 240 Betsileo
Located at RNP border,
no buffer zone
Vohiparara 325 Betsileo
Community-managed
forest
Ranovao 341 Tanala Buffer zone
Torotosy 286 Tanala Buffer zone
Ambatolahy 265 Tanala Buffer zone
The villages of Amboditanimena and Vohiparara are situated at the western side of the national
park, some five kilometres distance from each other along the bank of the river Namorona. The
residents of these two villages belong to the Betsileo cultural group, as do the majority of the
population of the highland plain west from the national park. The population of
Amboditanimena is approximately 240 and the number of households 40 (CVB 2013).
Vohiparara has approximately 325 habitants (70 households). Both villages have primary
schools. Amboditanimena and Vohiparara are surrounded by the protected area: Around the
houses, after rice paddy cultivations one can see rainforest in every direction (Figure 4).
Vohiparara is the only study village that has a community-managed forest. It is 25 hectares in
area and the villagers use the forest for gathering, collecting wood for fire and construction, and
for cultural rituals. The majority of the residents of Amboditanimena and Vohiparara are
39
farmers cultivating rice paddy and other crops. Traditionally these Betsileo villages use their
surrounding forests in diverse ways gathering a range of non-timber forest products, such as
crafts materials, medicinal plants, and crayfish. The villagers tell that tavy was  never  a
traditional practice on this highland side where there used to be plenty of wetland for rice paddy.
Vohiparara is the nearest market for the residents of Amboditanimena, and the other frequently
visited market is in Ambalakindresy, eight kilometres north. The national road 25 crosses both
villages and Vohiparara is a stop for Malagasy and sometimes also international travellers and
has some small businesses such as restaurants and kiosks. Fried crayfish are sold to passengers
on large plates in Vohiparara whereas in Amboditanimena hunting crayfish for sale is a fady.
Just near both villages are entrances to the national park used by tourist groups. This does not
however bring employment or income to the villages as the tours are booked in Ranomafana
village.
Figure 4. The border of the National Park surrounds the village of Amboditanimena
In both Amboditanimena and Vohiparara, CVB has conducted a health and hygiene program
and an environmental awareness raising for school children. There is also a conservation club
of selected members in Amboditanimena. An agriculture development project called Tany
Maitso (a development co-operation project of the Finnish NGO “Dodo ry”) has worked in the
village for many years teaching e.g. vegetable cultivation. However, the villagers tell that in
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recent years there have been few activities and they have lost confidence in Tany Maitso
personnel.
Recently, insecurity has increased along the western side of the national park (CVB,
Coordinator of Monitoring and Partnerships Department, personal communication). Banditry,
which has roots in the Betsileo cultural tradition of cow robbery (Korhonen 2006) has taken on
a more violent form. In Amboditanimena, doors are locked when the sun goes down and no-
one goes out for fear of bandits. The village is believed to be protected by a chosen member of
the villagers who by the use of magic is able to prevent bandit attack. In Vohiparara, where the
rural police (the gendarmerie) have an office, the situation is much calmer. However, there have
been strong tensions and open conflict situations between many of the Betsileo villages and the
RNP about gold mining inside the protected area. This has led to the breaking up of relations
between the villagers and conservation authorities who see it too unsafe to go to the villages.
Meanwhile, the Tanala side of the national park is not reported to be as insecure as the Betsileo
side, although some incidences were reported: at the time of fieldwork, one of the southern
villages was attacked by a group of gold miners coming from outside the area forcing the
residents to abandon the village.
Figure 6. Path to the eastern villages
The Tanala villages west from the national park are Ranovao, Torotosy, Ambatolahy, and
Manokoakora. Torotosy and Ranovao are both a couple of hours walk away from the road –
Figure 5. Burned slopes near Torotosy
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Ranovao to the south and Torotosy to the north. The landscape on the eastern side varies a lot
from the west.  The paths of red and golden mud go up and down the hilly landscape of rice
paddies in valleys, terraces and freshly burned black patches on slopes, lines of planted
eucalyptus trees, bushes, and secondary forest (Figures 5 and 6). Both Torotosy and Ranovao
are near the national park border and the buffer zone around it consists of forest fragments.  The
communities  do  not  have  the  authority  to  manage  these  fragments  or  cut  wood  without
permission from the Ministry official, i.e. the Chef Forestier. The wood is needed nevertheless,
and one can hear the distant sound of an axe echoing in the forests and see little clearings here
and there.
Figure 7. Cultivations around the primary school of Ranovao
Along the paths to Torotosy and Ranovao one passes a couple of other villages and sees how
close these communities are to one another. Ranovao in fact consists of two separate villages:
Ranovao  Haut  higher  on  a  hillside  and  Ranovao  Bas  in  the  valley.  Ranovao  Haut  has  81
habitants in 16 households and Ranovao Bas 260 habitants (52 households). Ranovao has a
primary school building (Figure 7) but it shares only one teacher with another community
nearby. The population of Torotosy is 286 (48 households). Torotosy has a primary school but
the members of the community state that they would want also a secondary school in the village.
These villages produce rice, bananas, and other agricultural products also for sale. In Torotosy,
breeding is an important livelihood which seems to contribute to the relative wealth of the
community. The key informant in Torotosy explains that the ones who have fields large enough
to produce rice for sale and who breed pigs are better off – but not all in the village have such
means or wealth. Indeed, already from the appearance one can see to the relative wealth of
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Torotosy: its repaired village path, its slightly bigger and neatly aligned houses, and all children
with proper clothes (as opposed to ragged), signalling better living standards than in many other
Tanala villages I came across.
In Torotosy, there has been an incident that has caused a lot of prejudice towards any outside
intervention or development project. Almost all the interviewees refer to a scam that happened
two years ago when a development project came promising agricultural training and materials
if  the  residents  made  an  inventory  of  all  the  things  they  felt  they  needed,  and  signed  the
inventory as members of an association. This included a membership fee and other paperwork
expenses, never to hear or see of these outside visitors again. Many people tell that they are not
sure if it was MNP, the commune, or someone else who initiated the project and betrayed them,
and they are seemingly distrustful towards outsiders. Later we heard from the mayor of
Ranomafana that the commune was involved with the “pretense” project, but got scammed like
the villages. CVB has ended all its activities in Torotosy and has not worked there in recent
years. In Ranovao, CVB has conducted activities aiming at improving health and hygiene as
well as awareness raising in the school, but also in Ranovao there have been problems of trust
between CVB personnel and the villagers.
Manokoakora is the only one of the study villages that is not directly at the border of the national
park.   It  is  about  10  kilometres  away,  along  the  main  road  from  Ranomafana  village.
Manokoakora is included in the analysis because it has a rather close connection to MNP: The
village authorities of Manokoakora were consulted in the creation of the park and the village
has received financial compensation for the protected area. Furthermore, the outreach program
of CVB has many health and hygiene activities there and has offered cyclone relief to the
village.
Manokoakora (Figures 8 and 9) has approximately 550 habitants (116 households). Children
and youth of Manokoakora go to school in Kelilalina, a bigger village about one kilometre away
along the road. There is also a high school where the students engage in a reforestation program.
The people of Manokoakora are mostly cultivators although other sources of income are sought
for,  e.g.  temporary  employment  in  towns.  There  is  an  active  community  association  in  the
village that has been founded in 2001. It is a subdivision for the communal association
Koloharena that works in cooperation with the Ministry of Environment and Forests and gets
funding from MNP. The objective of Koloharena is environmental awareness raising and
education of the population. The activities include reforestation and teaching fire protection,
and new rice cultivation techniques. Only villagers who own land can join Koloharena, meaning
that most of the members are adult men. The person responsible of Koloharena in Manokoakora
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is a respected and influential person in the community, who also states that his authority
prevents the villagers from breaking anti-fire laws.
Ambatolahy is located in a very hilly landscape inside the rainforest, only about a kilometre
away from CVB. While most of the village’s 265 habitants (58 households) are cultivators, a
significant number of them have gotten employment as MNP or CVB personnel or as tourist
guides. In recent years, Ambatolahy has received cyclone relief from CVB and a conservation
club has been formed with the villagers.
6. Results
6.1 Social impacts of RNP
6.1.1 Displacements
Spatial restrictions caused by the national park concerning natural resources use were discussed
in 32 interviews and all village meetings and focus groups. The current conservation strategy
prohibits all other activities in the protected area except walking and zebu pasture (this has been
agreed so that the children would be free to attend school when they do not have to tend zebus
to  keep  them away from cultivations  (as  told  by  a  Member  of  the  Association  of  Guides  of
Figure 8. Women of Manokoakora fetching water Figure 9. A gathering in Manokoakora
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RNP)). The traditional livelihood activities, such as gathering food, medicinal plants, and
products  that  can  be  sold  as  well  as  logging  wood  for  construction  and  fire,  have  been
criminalised inside the limits of the national park and are also restricted in the buffer zone. This
has resulted in a decrease in household income which affects for example the families' ability
to send their children to school. The main concern for the residents of the region is that the
existing fields are feared not to be able to produce enough food as the village population
continues to grow.
”The creation of the RNP did a lot of harm to this village. It decreased the income in each
household. The cultivable area diminished, honey and crayfish cannot be gathered
anymore. We have no money to send our children to school.” – Woman 24,
Amboditanimena
The impact of conservation varies in each village. Manokoakora is the only village where the
RNP seems to play quite a small role because it is also the only village not bordering the national
park. 5 out of 20 interviewees in Manokoakora do not even know its existence and 7 know only
the name but cannot tell anything more about it.
The most striking example of land struggles was seen in Amboditanimena where forced
eviction took place a decade after the national park was created. The people of Amboditanimena
used to have rice paddy in the valleys inside the forest in the area that is currently a part of the
national park. When the park was established they were promised that they can continue
cultivating in the 2,5 km wide buffer zone as long as they did not clear any forest. One key
informant tells that years later the promise was broken when as a part of the national act of
tripling protected areas the gendarme came to evict residents from the area, and now the village
has no real buffer zone separating it from the national park. A woman from Amboditanimena
describes the event:
”The problem is that the RNP denied us to cultivate the low land inside the park. Before
people of Amboditanimena had a lot of land on hills but they sold this to get the land in
the area where the park is now. Then the majority of the population lived inside the forest
and cultivated the low wetland there. But the RNP came and sent the gendarmerie to
chase us away from our houses and fields. Gendarmes came with guns and did not give
us time to gather our belongings; we had to leave everything in our houses. After this the
gendarmes robbed all in the houses: the little blankets and whatever small items the
already poor people had managed to acquire during years. This is the reason that there
are so many bandits nowadays and the village is a part of the “red zone”. The ordinary
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people are deprived of their only livelihood and possessions and they understand that the
law is not on their side but against them.” – Woman 24, Amboditanimena
A few remarks must be made when reading this story. If the interviewee told her age correctly
she must have been around nine years old at the time of the evictions and thus she must be
repeating the narrative discussed among the villagers – not only her own experience. Also,
banditry has cultural roots in Betsileo culture and cannot be explained only as a reaction to
repression by the authorities (See e.g. Korhonen-Kurki 2006: 44). True or not, the existence of
these kinds of narratives shapes the way MNP is seen by local communities affecting their
actions.
6.1.2 Social impacts of MNP’s co-management efforts
Table 5 presents the four components of co-management defined by MNP. Based on the
interview data, it describes how these components can be seen at the local level, by what the
interviewees have told, and what kinds of social impact result from the way these components
are implemented. Each component will be discussed separately in following chapters.
Table 5. Components of co-management and related social impacts
Co-management component Description Social impact
Protected area boundary abutted
by community-managed natural
resource areas
The majority of the communities
do not have management rights
to their forests
Implications on social
organisation and community-
institutions
Direct financial benefits accrued
by neighbouring populations
Development projects and
compensation are punctual and
unequally distributed
Recipient role, passiveness
No sustainable improvements,
disappointment, mistrust
Business opportunities in eco-
tourism centralised in
Ranomafana village
Eco-tourism benefits only
small portion of population
and creates few business
opportunities anywhere else
than in one village
Employment is offered
irregularly and payments do not
come on time
Indicates lack of respect for
the workers
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Protected area patrolled by
CLPs
Tensions between CLP members
and people of the same or
neighbouring communities.
Insecurity, further social
marginalisation of the poorest
villagers
Employment is unreliable and
irregular No partnership
Community participation No public participation indecision-making
NP is viewed illegitimate,
negative attitudes, passiveness
6.2 Natural resources management at the community level
As described above, Amboditanimena has no community-owned forest and no buffer zone
separating it from the national park, and Manokoakora does not have any forest nearby.
Vohiparara is the only study village that has a community managed forest. In Vohiparara the
village chief has the formal authority to control the use of the community forest, but according
to a key informant, management is mostly based on social control: if someone takes more than
needed others tell him/her to stop. Only honey and crayfish are gathered to be sold, but the
crayfish population in the community forest is so young at the moment that villagers have
paused catching them. The key informant tells that he thinks that the whole life of the village
depends on their forest.
In Torotosy and Ranovao people can gather forest products and construction wood in the buffer
zone if they get a permission from the Chef Forestier. In Ranovao, the process is described as
difficult and expensive. One interviewee tells that a permit costs 60.000–100.000 Ar. (around
20–32,00 USD) but people manage to pay it because it is the only way they can get wood. In
the village meeting in Torotosy, I was told that the forest area at the border of the park can be
used by the villagers, but they do not use it because they are so afraid of the Chef Forestier.
Later, it became evident that some wood is being used and sometimes forest is slashed and
burned illegally to create new fields. No community rules or norms concerning forest use came
up in the interviews in other villages than Vohiparara, except for  the  mention  of  a  few very
specific fadys.
Although these villages do not have a formal authority over their surrounding forests, they
attempt to protect them when they sometimes find themselves opposed with outsiders
competing for using the same forest. In all study villages except Amboditanimena, there is at
least one story about forest companies, “people from Fianarantsoa”, or gold miners exploiting
their forests. What is positive is that in these situations communities have managed to get help
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from local authorities namely Chef Forestier, MNP, or the mayor, in most cases succeeding to
make the outsiders leave.
The appropriateness of tavy is a contested topic in Tanala villages, especially in Manokoakora
and Torotosy. Especially in Manokoakora, many villagers who take part in the popular
community association for conservation, reforestation, and agricultural development advocate
for abandoning tavy, leading to frequent conversations and debates with those who want to
continue the traditional practice. The laws on burning (that define limits and safer practices for
burning) have offered guidelines by which tavy can be done within limits that community
members  can  agree  on  to  some extent.  The  argument  is  still  ongoing  and  in  Torotosy  many
interviewees tell that villagers turn each other in to the Chef Forestier who in turn sanctions
illegal burning.
Problems of environmental degradation and the value of forest in maintaining ecosystem
services such as clean water and humid climate were discussed in most of the interviews. There
are contrasting views even among family members of the necessity of the National Park. Some
state that the National Park is indispensable for conservation, otherwise locals would use all the
forest,  whereas  others  think  that  it  is  not  their  traditional  way  of  life  that  is  the  cause  of
deforestation and that they do not need the National Park to protect their forest. Some of the
latter types of statement include a strong sense of ownership of, and belonging to, the land and
an opposition to the “exploiter” role that local people are given by conservation authorities:
”We always protected the forest but now the national park has taken from us the right to
protect it and to take benefits from it. Way back people shared the forest and everyone
was responsible for their own actions. We used to collect honey, crayfish, and keep zebus
there. We also enjoyed walking in the forest. We still could go there but people do not go
often anymore because they are afraid. NP agents have told us that cutting a tree is like
killing a person and exploiting the forest will be heavily punished.” – Man 40, Torotosy
6.3 Actors involved in conservation in the region of Ranomafana
Figure 10 presents the actors involved in the conservation and management of natural
resources in RNP. Environmental legislation is implemented by the Chef Forestier in all state
owned land except in the protected areas which are controlled by MNP. The Chef Forestier
and MNP both operate under the Ministry of Environment and Forests and they cooperate in
restricting the use of forest by local communities and users coming from outside the area (red
arrows).
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CVB and partner organisations are conducting the outreach program that includes
environmental awareness raising, health and hygiene program and agricultural training. This
combined with compensation and employment offered by MNP constitute the “direct benefits”
received by local people (blue arrows). The users of natural resources are the local communities
but also many external users such as forest companies and gold miners who come from other
regions. The livelihood of the local communities, unlike the external users, depends entirely on
these lands and resources, and justifiably, they are defined as “primary stakeholders of
conservation” by MNP (MNP 2014). What must be acknowledged is that local communities
are not only users. As discussed above, they also manage certain resources, negotiate land uses
among  themselves  and  a  range  of  external  users  (not  referred  to  in  the  MNP  strategic
management plan), and are able to disobey the law. They also participate in the patrolling of
the park, in helping to ensure compliance with laws through CLP activities.
6.4 Distribution of benefits
Co-management indicator: “Direct financial benefits accrued by neighbouring populations“
According to MNP, the director of RNP, and many local participants, the development projects
that have been implemented to date in the communities surrounding RNP have been far from
Figure 10. The actors involved in conservation in the region of Ranomafana
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successful or sustainable. The reasons for these perceived failures are many. As the director of
RNP puts it:
”The value that people have lost cannot be sufficiently compensated by the support MNP
is giving. People say that they have not gotten any help because the help has been
punctual. It has not helped them sustainably.”
Despite the limited success of the local development projects, it is clear that people in the
villages are used to the idea that MNP is supposed to give them aid. In fact, during my
fieldwork, the majority of interviewees asked me to send a message to MNP telling them that
they (the villagers) need money, materials, infrastructure, and technical help as well as land.
Many also expressed that MNP has a moral responsibility to help them: to compensate to the
local people for that which has been taken away from them. They state that the benefits they
have gotten from RNP were either non-existent or insufficient in compensating the losses RNP
has caused.
The issue of distribution of benefits was also raised:
“The park pays communities for protected areas. But this is not so simple. Half of the
people get the money, some people get nothing. One village may benefit but others not.”
– Ranovao, focus group with women
The coordinator of conservation education (CVB) explains that even though half of RNP’s
entrance fees (50 % DEAP) continued to be given to local projects the system cannot solve the
main problems. Giving money for small projects can be unequal because it favours those who
can write a good proposal over the majority who have no experience in proposal writing but
who are motivated and hard-working. This can be seen among the study villages: one village
had received the 50 % DEAP three times while another not even once. Also, even though CVB
is or has been working in each study village, all residents cannot be reached. This may be due
to distance of some houses from the main village or social divisions in the community. Business
opportunities created by eco-tourism in other villages other than Ranomafana are practically
non-existent, as told by residents of the villages and guides of RNP.
Villagers in four household interviews and several village meetings proposed that the solution
for their livelihood problems would be for MNP to offer them work and preferably stable
employment. In Torotosy, Ranovao, Amboditanimena, and Vohiparara, MNP has provided the
residents with work such as building tourist tracts. In all but one community workers tell that
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they are not satisfied with the work, as it is offered irregularly and payments do not come on
time, which for many indicates a lack of respect for the workers. As one villager expressed:
”[T]he salary never comes on time and NP does not otherwise take care of  its
employees.” – Ranovao men focus group
Interestingly, while other communities claim having only part-time and unreliable jobs for very
few community members, as many as 62 people from Ambatolahy work as agents of RNP and
65 as guides. Still, they say that this is not enough. Villagers tell that the community is divided
in their opinion of RNP: there are some who support the organisation, but many are jealous
because they have not gotten employment and they feel that conservation is threatening them.
6.5 Local participation in patrolling of the Protected Area
In 47 communities at the buffer zone of RNP villagers have formed committees for park
patrolling (Director of RNP). Each participant is paid by MNP a daily salary. The young men
of Vohiparara and Torotosy take part in the CLP and they patrol the forest with a mixed brigade
of local gendarmerie, police, and army personnel looking out for any illegal activities taking
place within the park. According to the MNP strategic management plan, CLP activities also
include boundary maintenance, awareness and outreach in their respective communities, fire
control and support to researchers, but these were not mentioned in the interviews. MNP decides
on a patrolling operation around Vohiparara every 10–15 days, and recently, in each of these
patrols, illegal activities have been spotted, often more than five cases per patrol (Gendarmerie,
Vohiparara). In Torotosy CLP operations are more irregular and the members cannot count on
it as a source of income.
From the point of view of one particular local villager, the membership in CLP means an income
opportunity, albeit an unreliable one. Some are also motivated in conservation and everyone
involved is motivated to work for MNP for different reasons. In their Strategic Management
Pland 2014–2024, MNP presents as a sign of successful co-management. “[T]he extent of CLP
participation in protected area management – – gauges both the director’s efforts to integrate
the CLPs into park or reserve activities as well as the willingness of the CLP to participate”
(MNP 2014: 62).
To better understand the meanings of patrolling activities at the local level it is also important
to know who are the ones being patrolled. The main illegal activity at the moment is gold mining
and the miners come from villages around the park and also from other regions. Gold miners
are unorganised and driven to this activity by hunger and poverty (Gendarmerie, Vohiparara).
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Especially in Betsileo side of the park MNP is in direct conflict with some northern villages
because of gold mining (Coordinator of Monitoring and Partnerships Department, CVB).
 “The CLP is patrolling and reporting if they see illegal activities. The problem is that
the criminals are armed and as they recognise the faces of CLP members they might take
revenge. There is a tension between the villagers of Vohiparara and the criminals. There
has been no attacks so far but CLP members are afraid because the criminals keep
following them. They do not dare to go to the market for instance.” – Man 34, Vohiparara
At the Tanala side, tavy is the main illegal activity although gold mining also takes place. A
key informant in Torotosy tells that lately many people have been arrested by the Chef Forestier,
who in turn is assisted by CLP. One striking example of such an arrest is an incident told by a
woman who explains that since her husband died, the family has been in trouble because they
needed new land to cultivate but could not make it because it is men's work:
“My son was taken to Ifanadina to be punished for burning. He was only 12 years old
and he had done it because he wanted to help his family by creating a small piece of field.
He was sentenced to pay a 20 000 Ar. fine. It was people from both Bevoahazo and this
village who turned him in.” – Woman 35, Torotosy
6.6 Local involvement in conservation
Participation in the creation of the NP and its rules has been virtually non-existent in most of
the study villages. Not a word was mentioned about COSAP or any kind of community
involvement in management of the national park.
The creation of the RNP was discussed with the elders since it has happened more than 20 years
ago and many younger interviewees may not remember it. In Manokoakora, Vohiparara, and
Ambatolahy the National Park involved signed permission from the village leaders. In
Amboditanimena the creation of the NP was not discussed since the NP started affecting the
people only with the forced evictions that took place when the park had already been
established. According to the interviewees in Torotosy and Ranovao, the boundaries of the NP
were never discussed and the rules simply came to them top-down. People could read the new
rules on noticeboards or in letters from government.
The lack of participation and communication (i.e. the strict top-down conservation policy) has
a range of consequences at the local level. Local people’s perceptions on the imposed rules and
MNP affect  the  ways  they  react  to  these  rules  and  how they  view their  own possibilities  to
influence them. The ways rules are negotiated and enforced as well as any contact local people
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have with MNP personnel affect local people’s sense of being respected and heard, having a
voice and feeling equal. The extent to which the rights and human dignity of local people are
respected ultimately defines whether they can feel and have ownership of a project and view
any rules as legitimate. Table 6 presents how local people react to the rules of RNP and the
ways in which they are, and have been enforced.
Table 6. Local reactions to top-down rules
Even though there are some people who find the rules of RNP reasonable the majority of the
interviewees have difficulties accepting them. The fact that there has been no local participation
in decision-making and that the relation with MNP is found disrespectful triggers very negative
Reaction Description Example
Approval of
rules
Distance to NP makes rules
irrelevant,
Economic benefits gained
from MNP exceed losses
"There are good things. Forest protection
guarantees pure air and water for us. Also
sometimes the NP offers our son work such as
building tracks in the park." – Woman 58,
Torotosy
Disapproval of
rules
MNP is seen as unjust,
untrustworthy, disrespectful,
and unconcerned for the local
people's rights and wellbeing ”The national park betrayed us." – Man 77,Ranovao
Obedience
(reluctant)
Fear for authorities and
punishments
"The villagers are afraid of the authorities and
this is why we obey and do not try to negotiate.
But we are very unhappy." – Man 70, Ranovao
No means to negotiate
”I do not want to change anything because the
park does not bother me. I have no means to
complain so I follow the rules.” – Woman 38,
Amboditanimena
Denial of problems
“There is no negative side, only that we do not
have enough [resources] to make our living.” –
Man 55, Amboditanimena
Attempts to
negotiate
Open argument, propositions
for changing the relationship
with MNP
“In my opinion a local association should be
established to facilitate things with RNP and
manage crayfish catching in Vohiparara.” –
Man 39, Vohiparara
Disobedience
Poverty and hunger force
people to illegally use natural
resources
"The ordinary people are deprived of their only
livelihood and possessions and they understand
that the law is not on their side but against
them.” – Woman 24, Amboditanimena
Opposition Armed conflicts Gold mining conflicts between RNP and north-
western villages
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attitudes. Furthermore, mistrust resulting from the lack of communication may create obstacles
for local people to trust development projects (as described in Ranovao). Despite the common
dissatisfaction with MNP, few (16 out of 46) interviewees state that they would like to change
the rules or practices. The reasons are related to the hierarchical governance where authorities
are feared and ordinary people do not see any possibility to influence decision-making. In some
instances this leads to passiveness and a denial of problems even though they clearly exist: why
bother trying the impossible?
Despite the strong hierarchy and the lack of means to communicate with the authorities, most
interviewees express a will to cooperate and communicate with MNP. There are different
propositions for what should be changed. The propositions mostly involve MNP giving them
either work or land or other kind of help. But there are also individuals who want to change the
relationship between the communities and MNP. The idea is especially strong in
Amboditanimena, where one could imagine that residents would be most bitter towards MNP
due to the displacements. Residents of Amboditanimena express a will to negotiate land rights
with MNP but also the fact that they have not yet been able to do so. The most positive
perceptions on cooperation with MNP were in Vohiparara that already is very much involved
with conservation activities and has personal contacts with MNP staff. In Vohiparara people
also tell about an ongoing argument they have with MNP about crayfish that they would like to
catch inside the protected area while the population in their own forest is recovering. During
the years, communities have in fact managed to negotiate a few permissions with MNP. It is
allowed to keep zebus in the forest: this way children are not needed to guard them and they
can go to school. Also, during the rice harvest people are allowed to gather crafts materials from
the forest to make carpets needed in rice processing.
Even so, it becomes evident that while local people have positive expectations, the reality
remains that all communication and cooperation is dependent on MNP:
“Sometimes we do some cooperation with MNP. I can only hope that MNP wants to
cooperate with us because it is the authority. The villagers always want to hear what
MNP has to say.” – Man 45, Torotosy
As discussed above, people who disobey environmental laws are ordinary individuals, rather
than organised gangs. The rules are disobeyed when no other possibility exists: the poorest of
the society must make their living somehow. Direct opposition and even armed incidents with
MNP are taking place in the north-western Betsileo villages (not included in these study
villages) (CVB, Coordinator of Monitoring and Partnerships Department).
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7. Discussion
7.1 Key findings and reflections vis-à-vis the broader literature
This thesis attempts to analyse the management of a strict protected area, namely the
Ranomafana National Park,  from the point of view of the local communities.  It  inspects the
local involvement in biodiversity conservation and resulting social impacts related to the ways
local communities are willing to organise and manage natural resources and co-operate with
conservation authorities.
The literature review shows that throughout its history, RNP has been managed in a strict top-
down fashion, with only a fraction of attempted community-oriented approaches offering local
communities different development projects and some financial compensation. Currently, local
communities are defined by MNP as primary stakeholders of conservation, but the results of
this study show that in practice their rights have not been recognised: the majority of local
villagers expressed a frustration due to having no means to communicate with authorities or to
influence the rules that so directly affect their lives. Even though they wanted to cooperate, the
problem – as expressed by the villagers – is that MNP decides when and how to communicate.
Another  point  of  concern  is  that  of  equity,  recognition  and  participation  –  key  pillars  of
environmental justice, as argued by Schlosberg (2013), and critical for obtaining a truly morally
justifiable conservation strategy, as suggested by Brechin et al. (2002). The negative
consequences of the strict PA continue to be borne by local communities, especially the weakest
social groups, and these exceed the benefits that are intended with the existing but few
development projects. No representative participation in decision-making on the PA
management exists in the study villages. Thus, the local communities are not recognised as
equal stakeholders of conservation and their rights to equitable treatment and participation in
decision-making are not respected.
Disrespecting local communities’ rights and the lack of communication have important
consequences on the relationship between MNP and local communities and the legitimacy of
the PA, and hence also the ultimate likelihood of successful conservation outcomes. The
interview data shows that the imposed rules and regulations, and the authorities enforcing them,
are mostly seen as illegitimate in the eyes of local communities. As has been experienced also
elsewhere in Madagascar (Peters 1999; Kull 2002), this study similarly demonstrates that
imposed, dogmatic anti-fire rules have resulted in local opposition and only further emphasis
on tavy as an essential part of culture. Similarly, the top-down conservation approach that
imposes rules on local population without their consent or consultation has created resentment
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towards conservation authorities. In parallel, decades of unsustainable development projects
and insufficient compensation have led to scepticism, and as I have shown in this study, the
reactions to top-down governance are many and have already led to mistrust and even direct
opposition.
The other co-management indicators (besides participation in decision-making by COSAP)
defined by MNP, namely distribution of benefits, participation in CLP patrolling, and
community-management of forest areas, are perhaps fine goals but this study shows that they
can have complicated social outcomes due to the hierarchical governance structure in which
they are implemented. Below, I discuss what kinds of implications the implementation of “co-
management” has on the social organisation of local communities.
The current top-down conservation repeats the hierarchical governance structure which
continues to subordinate local communities, and creates a power dynamic where local people
are too afraid to speak up or try to influence. The lack of means to influence or forums to discuss
makes local people feel powerless and a part of them become passive and rather deny problems
than try to change them. The hierarchical structure is repeated in the donor–recipient
relationship of development programs and employment. Decades of supervision, environmental
awareness raising, and assistance have led many community members to a position where they
passively wait and expect outside intervention incapable of taking initiative or imagining that
the change could come from the community – not only from external aid (as discussed in Talbot
1995 and Pyhälä 2003). Clearly, development projects have not been able to fulfil the
expectation that they would somehow lead to some sort of co-management or a more equal
partnership with local communities.
Local  involvement  in  the  patrolling  of  the  PA  is  seen  by  MNP  as  an  indicator  of  co-
management. Gezon (2006) shows how community members who are hired by conservation
authorities face a situation where they have commitments to multiple, conflicting sources of
authority, from the formal legislation and foreign conservation norms to local kinship ties.
Ultimately, how this unfolds at the local level, and particularly in the case of patrolling, is that
CLP members have to choose between these commitments, and a noteworthy aspect in this
decision is that even turning against the members of their own or neighbouring communities
can provide individual short-term benefits, but at the cost of social cohesion and solidarity. In
other words, those with additional sources of income (e.g. from work in the CLP) and thus more
options to gain their living can turn the “wrong-doers” in. The so-called “criminals” on the other
hand are mostly people who are driven to illegal activities because of extreme poverty and
desperation, although in some instances also due to resentment towards MNP. This dynamic
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enforces the existing inequalities in and among communities, pushing the already less-endowed
individuals and households further into the margins of the society. It also creates tensions and
fear of revenge between villagers and families, as well as between villages and park managers,
and increases the overall underlying insecurity experienced by the local villagers.
The CLP structure is also a form of decentralisation without empowerment, as discussed by
Kull (2002) and Agrawal & Gibson (1999): members of local communities are given the task
of implementation of conservation rules without the ability to participate in defining the rules
or the authority to resolve disputes. Ribot (2004) and Kull (2002) argue that if decentralisation
is attempted without empowering the community, the result is even more centralisation. In this
sense, advocating CLP participation as a form of co-management is rather illogical.
The indicator of community-managed forest area gives more to think about when trying to
imagine what a true form of co-management could look like. Even when local community rights
to participate in decision-making are not formally recognised, local people are still key actors
shaping conservation outcomes and natural resources management on the ground. As the results
of my own study show, local people emphasise both the value of nature and their own belonging
to the land. In this light, one could argue that the goals of local communities and
conservationists are not necessarily in contradiction; quite on the contrary. As presented by
Martinez-Alier (2013) there is a so-called “environmentalism of the poor” who have the biggest
interests in conservation as they are directly dependent on local natural resources.
In order for a community to sustainably and equitably manage a forest area, certain local
institutions (for regulating the use of land and species sustainably as well as equitably among
community members) must be in place. Yet, as Ostrom (1990) reminds us, without local
communities actually having ownership of the land and resources, informal management
institutions are likely to disappear over time. This seems to be the case in most of the case study
villages  of  RNP. Fadys and other traditional regulations no longer have much relevance in
natural resources management as they have over time been replaced by national laws and
environmental awareness raising that are based on scientific and neoliberal world views (as
found also in other studies, e.g. Hanson 2012; Miller et al. 2014). Especially in Torotosy,
Ranovao, and Amboditanimena no discussions about how to manage the forest fragments were
witnessed, and hardly surprisingly, as locals feel that the rules and regulations have already
been defined and set upon them in law by the Chef Forestier and MNP.
That said, environmental legislation seems to be commonly discussed, debated, and used for
various purposes in the study communities. The community members refer to legislation when
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confronting external actors (as in other studies, e.g. Berkes 2004) but also in solving intra-
community disputes. The contrast between Manokoakora and Torotosy is worth pointing out:
while the residents of Manokoakora emphasise constant intra-community debates where some
community members argue for following the conservation rules and try to find ways to abandon
traditional practices, in Torotosy the discussion is more about punishments and strict
conservation rules enforced by authorities, not settled within the community. Yet, as stated in
the literature on community-based management (Berkes 2004), solutions to disputes could be
made more cost-efficient at the local level (as opposed to often rigid and costly court
proceedings at distant administrative centres). For instance, local community organisation
could function better for the greater equity and wellbeing of all if intra- and inter-community
disputes  were  solved  by  the  communities  themselves  –  rather  than  in  court.  In  terms  of
conservation, it is mostly CLP members (at least in Torotosy) and members of the community
association, or landowners (as in the case of Manokoakora), that promote conservation action.
Thus, in both villages the ones supporting traditional cultivation practices and gathering forest
products are likely to be those in weaker positions in the society.
As Gezon (2006) argues, conservation projects can either reinforce existing power asymmetries
or they can empower marginalised segments of the population. All evidence in the RNP case
seems to support the former, resulting in the further subordination and marginalisation of the
already weakest social groups. MNP and all development and conservation actors in the region
should take this problem into serious consideration, as it threatens both social and ecological
outcomes of existing policy. If current conservation and development strategies claim to aim at
enhancing local livelihoods, they should prioritise at targeting the poorest of the society, the
ones most dependent on forest resources, and those most easily driven to carry out sporadic
illegal activities in the NP – out of sheer desperation – and seek to offer these weaker pockets
of  society  alternative  ways  to  gain  their  living  and  channels  to  voice  and  stand  up  for  their
rights.
It is evident that the historical oppression of communities around Ranomafana has resulted in
a challenge for any new, more participatory conservation initiatives in the area. This burden
influences both sides. Local communities are sceptical of new conservation and development
initiatives and therefore try to take all the material benefit from them while they last rather than
self-organising or designing structures for long-term sustainability, let alone taking ownership
of the projects. Meanwhile, conservation authorities continue to blame local people’s ignorance
for deforestation. This, in turn, means that the so called “co-management” effort, as well as any
environmental awareness raising, is likely to be conducted in a disrespectful manner, working
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to only further enhance feelings of resentment among local communities. The result is a vicious
cycle of mistrust and disrespect on both sides – i.e. communities and authorities – which, over
time  and  generations,  is  difficult  to  break.  It  is  difficult  for  authorities  to  empower  local
communities, not surprisingly as local empowerment is hardly likely if communities continue
to be governed and treated in a top-down fashion with no respect or regard to their knowledge,
culture, history, or civil rights.
While this case study strongly supports the argument of previous literature that top-down
conservation models are bound to fail to support well-being and equity of local communities
and to gain community approval, it also shows evidence on how the NP–community
relationship can be different, and set into a much more positive tone (found only in one study
village). Vohiparara is the only village with its own forest which it has managed to maintain
despite claims from conservation authorities. On the one hand, the interviewees in Vohiparara
speak proudly of the good relations with MNP and the help they have received, on the other
hand they tell about the ongoing conflict with MNP over crayfish catching. The propositions
by local community members for solving the problem included formation of a community
association, reflecting a capability to take initiative, something which at least this study did not
find in the other study villages. What might have given this community more initiative than
other communities lay beyond the scope of this research, however, one explanation might be
the historical opposition, which might have led to a more frequent, prioritised and eventually
fluent communication between the community and MNP, with the latter teaching the people of
Vohiparara how to deal with MNP, leading to stronger community self-esteem, more courage
to confront problems, and therefore and overall a more active community. This question cannot
be answered based on the available data but it poses a fundamental and important question for
future research attempting to investigate ways for instigating more bottom-up initiative, and for
promoting stronger and more equitable and genuine partnerships between local communities
and the national park authorities.
6.2 Methodological considerations
The main challenges of data collection for this thesis are related to translation, cultural
differences, and inter-personal dynamics between the researcher, the researched, and other
persons involved. In a research project concentrating on sensitive topics such as conflicts and
tensions between local actors and authorities, building trust with the interviewees and
assuring that they will not be negatively affected by the research were my main prior
concerns. There was the possibility of becoming associated with CVB or MNP, yet I felt that
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this could represent some sort of threat or scepticism vis-a-vis local people. In explaining that
I do not represent any donor organisation or conservation authority, it was very convenient
that the translators were not from CVB either. I was surprised by the openness and warmth of
the people who welcomed me in their villages and homes. Despite the pure kindness and
curiosity expressed to me – a complete stranger – reasons for this warm welcoming might
have been the expectations that I would perhaps bring some kinds of benefits. Yet, mostly I
felt that people were happy that someone was interested in their lives. Some interviewees also
asked me to deliver messages to the National Park director and other authorities which I did.
There were one or two cases where the interviewee seemed so uncomfortable answering my
questions (even though his/her consent was asked beforehand) that I decided to interrupt the
interview as soon as I noticed this. The resulting data from these interviews has been removed
from the analysis, however the incidents serve as a remarkably interesting part of observation.
These contradictory incidences as well as the continuous observation of the ways in which the
villagers reacted to the research group and accompanying CVB guides only helped to deepen
my understanding of the relations between the different actors. Judging by my own experience,
I would argue that with this type of research questions, the outsider role of the researcher can
actually be helpful.
The data collection methods served well the purpose of this research. Especially the semi-
structured household interviews, which were the main method, developed greatly during the
field work and due to their flexibility were able to capture a wide range of phenomena important
in people’s lives. This study did not have any specific gender perspective. However, it was
taken care of that women and men were interviewed separately when possible. This was in fact
very easy due to everyday practices in the villages and women’s voice is heard slightly more
than that of men’s. Having spent only seven weeks in total in Madagascar, I notice that there
are barriers more than those related to language to overcome before achieving a truly deep
knowledge, trust, and understanding of the local realities. Some information is always lost in
translation; nuances and cultural meanings can be missed and sometimes data can be too
unreliable and has to be rejected.
The interpretation of data is impacted by e.g. the researcher’s disciplinary training, the
epistemological and methodological choices made, the researcher’s own involvement in data
collection, and familiarity with its content (Bazeley 2013). The two latter became particularly
obvious stressing the subjectivity of quantitative analysis and the strong involvement of the
researcher in the data gathering and analysis. The ‘messiness’ of social life that Crang & Cook
(2007) discuss was manifested in the amount of contradictory answers even in a single
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interview. This was a challenge to analyse, yet also the element that made the analysis
particularly fascinating and rich – as it simply presented the complexity of the problems at hand.
One of the aims of this study was to see the variety in perceptions, opinions, and realities and
the used coding method served this purpose well without losing the messiness and bigger and
smaller narratives of real life.
In the Results chapter the categories and conceptualisations that emerged from the qualitative
content analysis are presented to some extent following the four co-management indicators of
MNP. However, an important remark is that these indicators were not used to predetermine the
interview  questions  as  this  thesis  was  not  intended  to  be  an  evaluation  of  MNPs’  strategy
towards local communities. Rather, the fundamental principle and the starting point of data
collection was the relevance of it for the local residents of Ranomafana region. The meanings
that local people give to conservation and the perceptions they have of different actors,
including themselves, are attempted to be understood through an analysis of the institutional
arrangements governing the PA through the frameworks Political Ecology and Institutional
Theory offer on local communities’ rights and social organisation.
7. Conclusions
This case study has looked at the institutional arrangements and community involvement of
biodiversity conservation in order to help find ways to create a more meaningful partnership
between conservation authorities and local communities. The analysis of interview data
gathered in the communities around Ranomafana National Park reveals a range of social effects
of conservation policies and local reactions to them. An important observation is the variety of
actors involved in conservation starting with different social groups within and among local
communities. Conservation policies do not automatically treat all community members equally
or address inter-community problems. Elite capture of development or conservation activities
is a serious threat leading to further marginalisation of the weakest groups.
Despite the co-management efforts from conservation authorities, local communities of
Ranomafana region are not properly recognised as partners capable of participating in decision-
making of rules that directly affect their lives. The rules of the PA continue to be imposed top-
down. Nevertheless, local communities are dynamic actors able to adapt to, oppose, contest,
and use environmental legislation. Considering this, conservation policy would benefit from
embracing a more legitimate and representative form of governance – one that the local
communities approve of and respect. One way forward could be to better implement the
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environmental justice principles of equity of risks and benefits, recognition of  rights,  and
participation to decision-making.
One of the main conclusions that can be drawn from this analysis is that in failing to properly
address human dignity, and local people’s rights as human beings and stewards of their
ancestral lands, any attempted co-management easily fails. Economic benefits, environmental
awareness raising, or involvement of locals in patrolling do not result in partnership or mutual
understandings if no rights are conferred to local communities and communication is lacking.
Respect that the local people do have for their land and ecosystems can be hindered by
resentment towards illegitimate conservation or by the need to survive in the face of deepened
poverty. Empowerment of local communities to take initiative to change their future and
organise to manage their natural resources requires some authority over those resources, among
other factors. The results of this case study indicate that some degree of autonomy as well as
frequent communication with authorities could support community self-organisation and give
keys to a creation of a real partnership. This remains as a questions for future research.
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